De bello civili (Civil Wars)
Book 1
50 B.C.
"caes.civ.1.0": [1.0] Vossius's supplement to the first book: I will now say
nothing concerning the absurd opinion of those who assert that the following
Commentaries on the Civil War were not written by Caesar himself. Even without
the authority of Suetonius, the diction itself would be sufficient to convince
the most skeptical that Caesar and no other was the author. I am of the opinion
of those who think that the beginning of these Commentaries is lost. For I can
not be convinced that Caesar commenced so abruptly; and History itself gives
sufficient evidence that many circumstances require to be previously stated. For
which reason we thought that it would be well worth our attention to compile
from Plutarch, Appian, and Dion, a narrative of such facts as seemed necessary
to fill up the chasm; these facts are as follows: "When Caesar, after reducing
all Transalpine Gaul, had passed into Cisalpine Gaul, he determined for many
reasons to send embassadors to Rome to request for him the consulate, and a
prolongation of the command of his province. Pompey, who was estranged from
Caesar, although he was not as yet at open enmity with him, determined neither
to aid him by his influence nor openly oppose him on this occasion. But the
consuls Lentulus and Marcellus, who had previously been on unfriendly terms with
Caesar, resolved to use all means in their power to prevent him from gaining his
object. Marcellus in particular did not hesitate to offer Caesar other insults.
Caesar had lately planned the colony of Novumcomum in Gaul: Marcellus, not
content with taking from it the right of citizenship, ordered the principal man
of the colony to be arrested and scourged at Rome, and sent him to make his
complaints to Caesar: an insult of this description had never before been
offered to a Roman citizen. While these transactions are taking place, Caius
Curio, tribune of the commons, comes to Caesar in his province. Curio had made
many and energetic struggles, in behalf of the republic and Caesar's cause: at
length when he perceived that all his efforts were vain, he fled through fear of
his adversaries, and informed Caesar of all the transactions that had taken
place, and of the efforts made by his enemies to crush him. Caesar received
Curio with great kindness, as he was a man of the highest rank, and had great
claims on himself and the republic, and thanked him warmly for his numerous
personal favors. But Curio, as war was being openly prepared against Caesar,
advised him to concentrate his troops, and rescue the republic now oppressed by
a few daring men. Caesar, although he was not ignorant of the real state of
affairs, was however of opinion that particular regard should be paid to the
tranquillity of the republic, lest any one should suppose that he was the
originator of the war. Therefore, through his friends, he made this one request,
that two legions, and the province of Cisalpine Gaul, and Illyricum, should be
left him. All these acts were performed by Caesar, with the hope that his
enemies might be induced by the justice of his demands, to preserve the peace of
the republic. Even Pompey himself did not dare to oppose them. But when Caesar
could not obtain his request from the consuls, he wrote to the senate a letter,
in which he briefly stated his exploits and public services, and entreated that
he should not be deprived of the favor of the people, who had ordered, that he,
although absent, should be considered a candidate at the next elections; and he
stated also that he would disband his army, if the senate and people of Rome
would pass a resolution to that effect, provided that Pompey would do the same.
That, as long as the latter should retain the command of his army, no just
reason could exist that he [Caesar] should disband his troops and expose himself
to the insults of his enemies. He intrusts this letter to Curio to bear to its
destination; the latter traveled one hundred and sixty miles with incredible
dispatch, and reached the city in three days' time, before the beginning of
January, and before the consuls could pass any decree concerning Caesar's
command. Curio, after accomplishing his journey, kept the letter, and did not
give it up, until there was a crowded meeting of the senate, and the tribunes of
the commons were present; for he was afraid, lest, if he gave it up previously,
the consuls should suppress it.
"caes.civ.1.1": [1.1] When Caesar's letter was delivered to the consuls, they
were with great difficulty, and a hard struggle of the tribunes, prevailed on to
suffer it to be read in the senate; but the tribunes could not prevail, that any
question should be put to the senate on the subject of the letter. The consuls
put the question on the regulation of the state. Lucius Lentulus the consul
promises that he will not fail the senate and republic, "if they declared their
sentiments boldly and resolutely, but if they turned their regard to Caesar, and
courted his favor, as they did on former occasions, he would adopt a plan for
himself, and not submit to the authority of the senate: that he too had a means
of regaining Caesar's favor and friendship." Scipio spoke to the same purport,
"that it was Pompey's intention not to abandon the republic, if the senate would
support him; but if they should hesitate and act without energy, they would in
vain implore his aid, if they should require it hereafter."
"caes.civ.1.2": [1.2] This speech of Scipio's, as the senate was convened in
the city, and Pompey was near at hand, seemed to have fallen from the lips of
Pompey himself. Some delivered their sentiments with more moderation, as
Marcellus first, who in the beginning of his speech, said, "that the question
ought not to be put to the senate on this matter, till levies were made
throughout all Italy, and armies raised under whose protection the senate might
freely and safely pass such resolutions as they thought proper;" as Marcus
Calidius afterward, who was of opinion, "that Pompey should set out for his
province, that there might be no cause for arms; that Caesar was naturally
apprehensive as two legions were forced from him, that Pompey was retaining
those troops, and keeping them near the city to do him injury:" as Marcus Rufus,
who followed Calidius almost word for word. They were all harshly rebuked by
Lentulus, who peremptorily refused to propose Calidius's motion. Marcellus,
overawed by his reproofs, retracted his opinion. Thus most of the senate,
intimidated by the expressions of the consul, by the fears of a present army,
and the threats of Pompey's friends, unwillingly and reluctantly adopted
Scipio's opinion, that Caesar should disband his army by a certain day, and
should he not do so, he should he considered as acting against the state. Marcus
Antonius, and Quintus Cassius, tribunes of the people, interposed. The question
was immediately put on their interposition. Violent opinions were expressed;
whoever spoke with the greatest acrimony and cruelty was most highly commended
by Caesar's enemies.
"caes.civ.1.3": [1.3] The senate having broken up in the evening, all who
belonged to that order were summoned by Pompey. He applauded the forward, and
secured their votes for the next day; the more moderate he reproved and excited
against Caesar. Many veterans, from all parts, who had served in Pompey's
armies, were invited to his standard by the hopes of rewards and promotions.
Several officers belonging to the two legions, which had been delivered up by
Caesar, were sent for. The city and the comitium were crowded with tribunes,
centurions, and veterans. All the consul's friends, all Pompey's connections,
all those who bore any ancient enmity to Caesar, were forced into the senate
house. By their concourse and declarations the timid were awed, the irresolute
confirmed, and the greater part deprived of the power of speaking their
sentiments with freedom. Lucius Piso, the censor, offered to go to Caesar: as
did likewise Lucius Roscius, the praetor, to inform him of these affairs, and
require only six days' time to finish the business. Opinions were expressed by
some to the effect that commissioners should be sent to Caesar to acquaint him
with the senate's pleasure.
"caes.civ.1.4": [1.4] All these proposals were rejected, and opposition made
to them all, in the speeches of the consul, Scipio, and Cato. An old grudge
against Caesar and chagrin at a defeat actuated Cato. Lentulus was wrought upon
by the magnitude of his debts, and the hopes of having the government of an army
and provinces, and by the presents which he expected from such princes as should
receive the title of friends of the Roman people, and boasted among his friends,
that he would be a second Sylla, to whom the supreme authority should return.
Similar hopes of a province and armies, which he expected to share with Pompey
on account of his connection with him, urged on Scipio; and moreover [he was
influenced by] the fear of being called to trial, and the adulation and an
ostentatious display of himself and his friends in power, who at that time had
great influence in the republic, and courts of judicature. Pompey himself,
incited by Caesar's enemies, because he was unwilling that any person should
bear an equal degree of dignity, had wholly alienated himself from Caesar's
friendship, and procured a reconciliation with their common enemies; the
greatest part of whom he had himself brought upon Caesar during his affinity
with him. At the same time, chagrined at the disgrace which he had incurred by
converting the two legions from their expedition through Asia and Syria, to
[augment] his own power and authority, he was anxious to bring matters to a war.
"caes.civ.1.5": [1.5] For these reasons every thing was done in a hasty and
disorderly manner, and neither was time given to Caesar's relations to inform
him [of the state of affairs] nor liberty to the tribunes of the people to
deprecate their own danger, nor even to retain the last privilege, which Sylla
had left them, the interposing their authority; but on the seventh day they were
obliged to think of their own safety, which the most turbulent tribunes of the
people were not accustomed to attend to, nor to fear being called to an account
for their actions, till the eighth month. Recourse is had to that extreme and
final decree of the senate (which was never resorted to even by daring proposers
except when the city was in danger of being set on fire, or when the public
safety was despaired of). "That the consuls, praetors, tribunes of the people,
and proconsuls in the city, should take care that the state received no injury."
These decrees are dated the eighth day before the ides of January; therefore, in
the first five days, on which the senate could meet, from the day on which
Lentulus entered into his consulate, the two days of election excepted, the
severest and most virulent decrees were passed against Caesar's government, and
against those most illustrious characters, the tribunes of the people. The
latter immediately made their escape from the city, and withdrew to Caesar, who
was then at Ravenna, awaiting an answer to his moderate demands; [to see] if
matters could be brought to a peaceful termination by any equitable act on the
part of his enemies.
"caes.civ.1.6": [1.6] During the succeeding days the senate is convened
outside the city. Pompey repeated the same things which he had declared through
Scipio. He applauded the courage and firmness of the senate, acquainted them
with his force, and told them that he had ten legions ready; that he was
moreover informed and assured that Caesar's soldiers were disaffected, and that
he could not persuade them to defend or even follow him. Motions were made in
the senate concerning other matters; that levies should be made through all
Italy; that Faustus Sylla should be sent as propraetor into Mauritania; that
money should be granted to Pompey from the public treasury. It was also put to
the vote that king Juba should be [honored with the title of] friend and ally.
But Marcellus said that he would not allow this motion for the present. Philip,
one of the tribunes, stopped [the appointment of] Sylla; the resolutions
respecting the other matters passed. The provinces, two of which were consular,
the remainder praetorian, were decreed to private persons; Scipio got Syria,
Lucius Domitius Gaul: Philip and Marcellus were omitted, from a private motive,
and their lots were not even admitted. To the other provinces praetors were
sent, nor was time granted as in former years, to refer to the people on their
appointment, nor to make them take the usual oath, and march out of the city in
a public manner, robed in the military habit, after offering their vows: a
circumstance which had never before happened. Both the consuls leave the city,
and private men had lictors in the city and capital, contrary to all precedents
of former times. Levies were made throughout Italy, arms demanded, and money
exacted from the municipal towns, and violently taken from the temples. All
distinctions between things human and divine, are confounded.
"caes.civ.1.7": [1.7] These things being made known to Caesar, he harangued
his soldiers; he reminded them "of the wrongs done to him at all times by his
enemies, and complained that Pompey had been alienated from him and led astray
by them through envy and a malicious opposition to his glory, though he had
always favored and promoted Pompey's honor and dignity. He complained that an
innovation had been introduced into the republic, that the intercession of the
tribunes, which had been restored a few years before by Sylla, was branded as a
crime, and suppressed by force of arms; that Sylla, who had stripped the
tribunes of every other power, had, nevertheless, left the privilege of
intercession unrestrained; that Pompey, who pretended to restore what they had
lost, had taken away the privileges which they formerly had; that whenever the
senate decreed, 'that the magistrates should take care that the republic
sustained no injury' (by which words and decree the Roman people were obliged to
repair to arms), it was only when pernicious laws were proposed; when the
tribunes attempted violent measures; when the people seceded, and possessed
themselves of the temples and eminences of the city; (and these instances of
former times, he showed them were expiated by the fate of Saturninus and the
Gracchi): that nothing of this kind was attempted now, nor even thought of: that
no law was promulgated, no intrigue with the people going forward, no secession
made; he exhorted them to defend from the malice of his enemies the reputation
and honor of that general under whose command they had for nine years most
successfully supported the state; fought many successful battles, and subdued
all Gaul and Germany." The soldiers of the thirteenth legion, which was present
(for in the beginning of the disturbances he had called it out, his other
legions not having yet arrived), all cry out that they are ready to defend their
general, and the tribunes of the commons, from all injuries.
"caes.civ.1.8": [1.8] Having made himself acquainted with the disposition of
his soldiers, Caesar set off with that legion to Ariminum, and there met the
tribunes, who had fled to him for protection; he called his other legions from
winter quarters; and ordered them to follow him. Thither came Lucius Caesar, a
young man, whose father was a lieutenant-general under Caesar. He, after
concluding the rest of his speech, and stating for what purpose he had come,
told Caesar that he had commands of a private nature for him from Pompey; that
Pompey wished to clear himself to Caesar, lest he should impute those actions
which he did for the republic, to a design of affronting him; that he had ever
preferred the interest of the state to his own private connections; that Caesar,
too, for his own honor, ought to sacrifice his desires and resentment to the
public good, and not vent his anger so violently against his enemies, lest in
his hopes of injuring them, he should injure the republic. He spoke a few words
to the same purport from himself, in addition to Pompey's apology. Roscius, the
praetor, conferred with Caesar almost in the same words, and on the same
subject, and declared that Pompey had empowered him to do so.
"caes.civ.1.9": [1.9] Though these things seemed to have no tendency toward
redressing his injuries, yet having got proper persons by whom he could
communicate his wishes to Pompey; he required of them both, that, as they had
conveyed Pompey's demands to him, they should not refuse to convey his demands
to Pompey; if by so little trouble they could terminate a great dispute, and
liberate all Italy from her fears. "That the honor of the republic had ever been
his first object, and dearer to him than life; that he was chagrined, that the
favor of the Roman people was wrested from him by the injurious reports of his
enemies; that he was deprived of a half-year's command, and dragged back to the
city, though the people had ordered that regard should be paid to his suit for
the consulate at the next election, though he was not present; that, however, he
had patiently submitted to this loss of honor, for the sake of the republic;
that when he wrote letters to the senate, requiring that all persons should
resign the command of their armies, he did not obtain even that request; that
levies were made throughout Italy; that the two legions which had been taken
from him, under the pretense of the Parthian war, were kept at home, and that
the state was in arms. To what did all these things tend, unless to his ruin?
But, nevertheless, he was ready to condescend to any terms, and to endure every
thing for the sake of the republic. Let Pompey go to his own province; let them
both disband their armies; let all persons in Italy lay down their arms; let all
fears be removed from the city; let free elections, and the whole republic be
resigned to the direction of the senate and Roman people. That these things
might be the more easily performed, and conditions secured and confirmed by
oath, either let Pompey come to Caesar, or allow Caesar to go to him; it might
be that all their disputes would be settled by an interview."
"caes.civ.1.10": [1.10] Roscius and Lucius Caesar, having received this
message, went to Capua, where they met the consuls and Pompey, and declared to
them Caesar's terms. Having deliberated on the matter, they replied, and sent
written proposals to him by the same persons, the purport of which was, that
Caesar should return into Gaul, leave Ariminum, and disband his army: if he
complied with this, that Pompey would go to Spain. In the mean time, until
security was given that Caesar would perform his promises, that the consuls and
Pompey would not give over their levies.
"caes.civ.1.11": [1.11] It was not an equitable proposal, to require that
Caesar should quit Ariminum and return to his province; but that he [Pompey]
should himself retain his province and the legions that belonged to another, and
desire that Caesar's army should be disbanded, while he himself was making new
levies: and that he should merely promise to go to his province, without naming
the day on which he would set out; so that if he should not set out till after
Caesar's consulate expired, yet he would not appear bound by any religious
scruples about asserting a falsehood. But his not granting time for a
conference, nor promising to set out to meet him, made the expectation of peace
appear very hopeless. Caesar, therefore, sent Marcus Antonius, with five cohorts
from Ariminum to Arretium; he himself staid at Ariminum with two legions, with
the intention of raising levies there. He secured Pisaurus, Fanum, and Ancona,
with a cohort each.
"caes.civ.1.12": [1.12] In the mean time, being informed that Thermus the
praetor was in possession of Iguvium, with five cohorts, and was fortifying the
town, but that the affections of all the inhabitants were very well inclined
toward himself, he detached Curio with three cohorts, which he had at Ariminum
and Pisaurus. Upon notice of his approach, Thermus, distrusting the affections
of the townsmen, drew his cohorts out of it and made his escape; his soldiers
deserted him on the road, and returned home. Curio recovered Iguvium, with the
cheerful concurrence of all the inhabitants. Caesar, having received an account
of this, and relying on the affections of the municipal towns, drafted all the
cohorts of the thirteenth legion from the garrison, and set out for Auximum, a
town into which Attius had brought his cohorts, and of which he had taken
possession, and from which he had sent senators round about the country of
Picenum, to raise new levies.
"caes.civ.1.13": [1.13] Upon news of Caesar's approach, the senate of Auximum
went in a body to Attius Varus; and told him that it was not a subject for them
to determine upon: yet neither they, nor the rest of the freemen would suffer
Caius Caesar, a general, who had merited so well of the republic, after
performing such great achievements, to be excluded from their town and walls;
wherefore he ought to pay some regard to the opinion of posterity, and his own
danger. Alarmed at this declaration, Attius Varus drew out of the town the
garrison which he had introduced, and fled. A fear of Caesar's front rank having
pursued him, obliged him to halt, and when the battle began, Varus is deserted
by his troops: some of them disperse to their homes, the rest come over to
Caesar; and along with them, Lucius Pupius, the chief centurion, is taken
prisoner and brought to Caesar. He had held the same rank before in Cneius
Pompey's army. But Caesar applauded the soldiers of Attius, set Pupius at
liberty, returned thanks to the people of Auximum, and promised to be grateful
for their conduct.
"caes.civ.1.14": [1.14] Intelligence of this being brought to Rome, so great
a panic spread on a sudden that when Lentulus, the consul, came to open the
treasury, to deliver money to Pompey by the senate's decree, immediately on
opening the hallowed door he fled from the city. For it was falsely rumored that
Caesar was approaching, and that his cavalry were already at the gates.
Marcellus, his colleague, followed him, and so did most of the magistrates.
Cneius Pompey had left the city the day before, and was on his march to those
legions which he had received from Caesar, and had disposed in winter quarters
in Apulia. The levies were stopped within the city. No place on this side of
Capua was thought secure. At Capua they first began to take courage and to
rally, and determined to raise levies in the colonies, which had been sent
thither by the Julian law: and Lentulus brought into the public market place the
gladiators which Caesar maintained there for the entertainment of the people,
and confirmed them in their liberty, and gave them horses and ordered them to
attend him; but afterward, being warned by his friends that this action was
censured by the judgment of all, he distributed them among the slaves of the
district of Campania, to keep guard there.
"caes.civ.1.15": [1.15] Caesar, having moved forward from Auximum, traversed
the whole country of Picenum. All the governors in these countries most
cheerfully received him, and aided his army with every necessary. Embassadors
came to him even from Cingulum, a town which Labienus had laid out and built at
his own expense, and offered most earnestly to comply with his orders. He
demanded soldiers: they sent them. In the mean time, the twelfth legion came to
join Caesar; with these two he marched to Asculum, the chief town of Picenum.
Lentulus Spinther occupied that town with ten cohorts; but, on being informed of
Caesar's approach, he fled from the town, and, in attempting to bring off his
cohorts with him, was deserted by a great part of his men. Being left on the
road with a small number, he fell in with Vibullius Rufus, who was sent by
Pompey into Picenum to confirm the people [in their allegiance]. Vibullius,
being informed by him of the transactions in Picenum, takes his soldiers from
him and dismisses him. He collects, likewise, from the neighboring countries, as
many cohorts as he can from Pompey's new levies. Among them he meets with
Ulcilles Hirrus fleeing from Camerinum, with six cohorts, which he had in the
garrison there; by a junction with which he made up thirteen cohorts. With them
he marched by hasty journeys to Corfinium, to Domitius Aenobarbus, and informed
him that Caesar was advancing with two legions. Domitius had collected about
twenty cohorts from Alba, and the Marsians, Pelignians, and neighboring states.
"caes.civ.1.16": [1.16] Caesar, having recovered Asculum and driven out
Lentulus, ordered the soldiers that had deserted from him to be sought out and a
muster to be made; and, having delayed for one day there to provide corn, he
marched to Corfinium. On his approach, five cohorts, sent by Domitius from the
town, were breaking down a bridge which was over the river, at three miles'
distance from it. An engagement taking place there with Caesar's advanced-guard,
Domitius's men were quickly beaten off from the bridge and retreated
precipitately into the town. Caesar, having marched his legions over, halted
before the town and encamped close by the walls.
"caes.civ.1.17": [1.17] Domitius, upon observing this, sent messengers well
acquainted with the country, encouraged by a promise of being amply rewarded,
with dispatches to Pompey to Apulia, to beg and entreat him to come to his
assistance. That Caesar could be easily inclosed by the two armies, through the
narrowness of the country, and prevented from obtaining supplies: unless he did
so, that he and upward of thirty cohorts, and a great number of senators and
Roman knights, would be in extreme danger. In the mean time he encouraged his
troops, disposed engines on the walls, and assigned to each man a particular
part of the city to defend. In a speech to the soldiers he promised them lands
out of his own estate; to every private soldier four acres, and a corresponding
share to the centurions and veterans.
"caes.civ.1.18": [1.18] In the mean time, word was brought to Caesar that the
people of Sulmo, a town about seven miles distant from Corfinium, were ready to
obey his orders, but were prevented by Quintus Lucretius, a senator, and Attius,
a Pelignian, who were in possession of the town with a garrison of seven
cohorts. He sent Marcus Antonius thither, with five cohorts of the eighth
legion. The inhabitants, as soon as they saw our standards, threw open their
gates, and all the people, both citizens and soldiers, went out to meet and
welcome Antonius. Lucretius and Attius leaped off the walls. Attius, being
brought before Antonius, begged that he might be sent to Caesar. Antonius
returned the same day on which he had set out with the cohorts and Attius.
Caesar added these cohorts to his own army, and sent Attius away in safety. The
three first days Caesar employed in fortifying his camp with strong works, in
bringing in corn from the neighboring free towns, and waiting for the rest of
his forces. Within the three days the eighth legion came to him, and twenty-two
cohorts of the new levies in Gaul, and about three hundred horse from the king
of Noricum. On their arrival he made a second camp on another part of the town,
and gave the command of it to Curio. He determined to surround the town with a
rampart and turrets during the remainder of the time. Nearly at the time when
the greatest part of the work was completed, all the messengers sent to Pompey
returned.
"caes.civ.1.19": [1.19] Having read Pompey's letter, Domitius, concealing the
truth, gave out in council that Pompey would speedily come to their assistance;
and encouraged them not to despond, but to provide every thing necessary for the
defense of the town. He held private conferences with a few of his most intimate
friends, and determined on the design of fleeing. As Domitius's countenance did
not agree with his words, and he did every thing with more confusion and fear
than he had shown on the preceding days, and as he had several private meetings
with his friends, contrary to his usual practice, in order to take their advice,
and as he avoided all public councils and assemblies of the people, the truth
could be no longer hid nor dissembled; for Pompey had written back in answer,
"That he would not put matters to the last hazard; that Domitius had retreated
into the town of Corfinium without either his advice or consent. Therefore, if
any opportunity should offer, he [Domitius] should come to him with the whole
force." But the blockade and works round the town prevented his escape.
"caes.civ.1.20": [1.20] Domitius's design being noised abroad, the soldiers
in Corfinium early in the evening began to mutiny, and held a conference with
each other by their tribunes and centurions, and the most respectable among
themselves: "that they were besieged by Caesar; that his works and
fortifications were almost finished; that their general, Domitius, on whose
hopes and expectations they had confided, had thrown them off, and was
meditating his own escape; that they ought to provide for their own safety." At
first the Marsians differed in opinion, and possessed themselves of that part of
the town which they thought the strongest. And so violent a dispute arose
between them, that they attempted to fight and decide it by arms. However, in a
little time, by messengers sent from one side to the other, they were informed
of Domitius's meditated flight, of which they were previously ignorant.
Therefore they all with one consent brought Domitius into public view, gathered
round him, and guarded him; and sent deputies out of their number to Caesar, to
say that they were ready to throw open their gates, to do whatever he should
order, and deliver up Domitius alive into his hands."
"caes.civ.1.21": [1.21] Upon intelligence of these matters, though Caesar
thought it of great consequence to become master of the town as soon as
possible, and to transfer the cohorts to his own camp, lest any change should be
wrought on their inclinations by bribes, encouragement, or ficticious messages,
because in war great events are often brought about by trifling circumstances;
yet, dreading lest the town should be plundered by the soldiers entering into
it, and taking advantage of the darkness of the night, he commended the persons
who came to him, and sent them back to the town, and ordered the gates and walls
to be secured. He disposed his soldiers on the works which he had begun, not at
certain intervals, as was his practice before, but in one continued range of
sentinels and stations, so that they touched each other, and formed a circle
round the whole fortification; he ordered the tribunes and general officers to
ride round; and exhorted them not only to be on their guard against sallies from
the town, but also to watch that no single person should get out privately. Nor
was any man so negligent or drowsy as to sleep that night. To so great height
was their expectation raised, that they were carried away, heart and soul, each
to different objects, what would become of the Corfinians, what of Domitius,
what of Lentulus, what of the rest; what event would be the consequence of
another.
"caes.civ.1.22": [1.22] About the fourth watch, Lentulus Spinther said to our
sentinels and guards from the walls, that he desired to have an interview with
Caesar, if permission were given him. Having obtained it, he was escorted out of
town; nor did the soldiers of Domitius leave him till they brought him into
Caesar's presence. He pleaded with Caesar for his life, and entreated him to
spare him, and reminded him of their former friendship; and acknowledged that
Caesar's favors to him were very great; in that through his interest he had been
admitted into the college of priests; in that after his praetorship he had been
appointed to the government of Spain; in that he had been assisted by him in his
suit for the consulate. Caesar interrupted him in his speech, and told him,
"that he had not left his province to do mischief [to any man], but to protect
himself from the injuries of his enemies; to restore to their dignity the
tribunes of the people who had been driven out of the city on his account, and
to assert his own liberty, and that of the Roman people, who were oppressed by a
few factious men. Encouraged by this address, Lentulus begged leave to return to
the town, that the security which he had obtained for himself might be an
encouragement to the rest to hope for theirs; saying that some were so terrified
that they were induced to make desperate attempts on their own lives. Leave
being granted him, he departed.
"caes.civ.1.23": [1.23] When day appeared, Caesar ordered all the senators
and their children, the tribunes of the soldiers, and the Roman knights to be
brought before him. Among the persons of senatorial rank were Lucius Domitius,
Publius Lentulus Spinther, Lucius Vibullius Rufus, Sextus Quintilius Varus, the
quaestor, and Lucius Rubrius, besides the son of Domitius, and several other
young men, and a great number of Roman knights and burgesses, whom Domitius had
summoned from the municipal towns. When they were brought before him he
protected them from the insolence and taunts of the soldiers; told them in few
words that they had not made him a grateful return, on their part, for his very
extraordinary kindness to them, and dismissed them all in safety. Sixty
sestertia, which Domitius had brought with him and lodged in the public
treasury, being brought to Caesar by the magistrates of Corfinium, he gave them
back to Domitius, that he might not appear more moderate with respect to the
life of men than in money matters, though he knew that it was public money, and
had been given by Pompey to pay his army. He ordered Domitius's soldiers to take
the oath to himself, and that day decamped and performed the regular march. He
staid only seven days before Corfinium, and marched into Apulia through the
country of the Marrucinians, Frentanian's and Larinates.
"caes.civ.1.24": [1.24] Pompey, being informed of what had passed at
Corfinium, marches from Luceria to Canusium, and thence to Brundusium. He orders
all the forces raised every where by the new levies to repair to him. He gives
arms to the slaves that attended the flocks, and appoints horses for them. Of
these he made up about three hundred horse. Lucius, the praetor, fled from Alba,
with six cohorts: Rutilus, Lupus, the praetor, from Tarracina, with three. These
having descried Caesar's cavalry at a distance, which were commanded by Bivius
Curius, and having deserted the praetor, carried their colors to Curius and went
over to him. In like manner, during the rest of his march, several cohorts fell
in with the main body of Caesar's army, others with his horse. Cneius Magius,
from Cremona, engineer-general to Pompey, was taken prisoner on the road and
brought to Caesar, but sent back by him to Pompey with this message: "As
hitherto he had not been allowed an interview, and was now on his march to him
at Brundusium, that it deeply concerned the commonwealth and general safety that
he should have an interview with Pompey; and that the same advantage could not
be gained at a great distance when the proposals were conveyed to them by
others, as if terms were argued by them both in person."
"caes.civ.1.25": [1.25] Having delivered this message he marched to
Brundusium with six legions, four of them veterans: the rest those which he had
raised in the late levy and completed on his march, for he had sent all
Domitius's cohorts immediately from Corfinium to Sicily. He discovered that the
consuls were gone to Dyrrachium with a considerable part of the army, and that
Pompey remained at Brundusium with twenty cohorts; but could not find out, for a
certainty, whether Pompey staid behind to keep possession of Brundusium, that he
might the more easily command the whole Adriatic sea, with the extremities of
Italy and the coast of Greece, and be able to conduct the war on either side of
it, or whether he remained there for want of shipping; and, being afraid that
Pompey would come to the conclusion that he ought not to relinquish Italy, he
determined to deprive him of the means of communication afforded by the harbor
of Brundusium. The plan of his work was as follows: Where the mouth of the port
was narrowest he threw up a mole of earth on either side, because in these
places the sea was shallow. Having gone out so far that the mole could not be
continued in the deep water, he fixed double floats, thirty feet on either side,
before the mole. These he fastened with four anchors at the four corners, that
they might not be carried away by the waves. Having completed and secured them,
he then joined to them other floats of equal size. These he covered over with
earth and mold, that he might not be prevented from access to them to defend
them, and in the front and on both sides he protected them with a parapet of
wicker work; and on every fourth one raised a turret, two stories high, to
secure them the better from being attacked by the shipping and set on fire.
"caes.civ.1.26": [1.26] To counteract this, Pompey fitted out large merchant
ships, which he found in the harbor of Brundusium: on them he erected turrets
three stories high, and, having furnished them with several engines and all
sorts of weapons, drove them among Caesar's works, to break through the floats
and interrupt the works; thus there happened skirmishes every day at a distance
with slings, arrows, and other weapons. Caesar conducted matters as if he
thought that the hopes of peace were not yet to be given up. And though he was
very much surprised that Magius, whom he had sent to Pompey with a message, was
not sent back to him; and though his attempting a reconciliation often retarded
the vigorous prosecution of his plans, yet he thought that he ought by all means
to persevere in the same line of conduct. He therefore sent Caninius Rebilus to
have an interview with Scribonius Libo, his intimate friend and relation. He
charges him to exhort Libo to effect a peace, but, above all things, requires
that he should be admitted to an interview with Pompey. He declared that he had
great hopes, if that were allowed him, that the consequence would be that both
parties would lay down their arms on equal terms; that a great share of the
glory and reputation of that event would redound to Libo, if, through his advice
and agency, hostilities should be ended. Libo, having parted from the conference
with Caninius, went to Pompey, and, shortly after, returns with answer that, as
the consuls were absent, no treaty of composition could be engaged in without
them. Caesar therefore thought it time at length to give over the attempt which
he had often made in vain, and act with energy in the war.
"caes.civ.1.27": [1.27] When Caesar's works were nearly half finished, and
after nine days were spent in them, the ships which had conveyed the first
division of the army to Dyrrachium being sent back by the consuls, returned to
Brundusium. Pompey, either frightened at Caesar's works or determined from the
beginning to quit Italy, began to prepare for his departure on the arrival of
the ships; and the more effectually to retard Caesar's attack, lest his soldiers
should force their way into the town at the moment of his departure, he stopped
up the gates, built walls across the streets and avenues, sunk trenches across
the ways, and in them fixed palisadoes and sharp stakes, which he made level
with the ground by means of hurdles and clay. But he barricaded with large beams
fastened in the ground and sharpened at the ends two passages and roads without
the walls, which led to the port. After making these arrangements, he ordered
his soldiers to go on board without noise, and disposed here and there, on the
wall and turrets, some light-armed veterans, archers and slingers. These he
designed to call off by a certain signal, when all the soldiers were embarked,
and left row-galleys for them in a secure place.
"caes.civ.1.28": [1.28] The people of Brundusium, irritated by the insolence
of Pompey's soldiers, and the insults received from Pompey himself, were in
favor of Caesar's party. Therefore, as soon as they were aware of Pompey's
departure, while his men were running up and down, and busied about their
voyage, they made signs from the tops of the houses: Caesar, being apprised of
the design by them, ordered scaling-ladders to be got ready, and his men to take
arms, that he might not lose any opportunity of coming to an action. Pompey
weighed anchor at nightfall. The soldiers who had been posted on the wall to
guard it, were called off by the signal which had been agreed on, and knowing
the roads, ran down to the ships. Caesar's soldiers fixed their ladders and
scaled the walls: but being cautioned by the people to beware of the hidden
stakes and covered trenches, they halted, and being conducted by the inhabitants
by a long circuit, they reached the port, and captured with their long boats and
small craft two of Pompey's ships, full of soldiers, which had struck against
Caesar's moles.
"caes.civ.1.29": [1.29] Though Caesar highly approved of collecting a fleet,
and crossing the sea, and pursuing Pompey before he could strengthen himself
with his transmarine auxiliaries, with the hope of bringing the war to a
conclusion, yet he dreaded the delay and length of time necessary to effect it:
because Pompey, by collecting all his ships, had deprived him of the means of
pursuing him at present. The only resource left to Caesar, was to wait for a
fleet from the distant regions of Gaul, Picenum, and the straits of Gibraltar.
But this, on account of the season of the year, appeared tedious and
troublesome. He was unwilling that, in the mean time, the veteran army, and the
two Spains, one of which was bound to Pompey by the strongest obligations,
should be confirmed in his interest; that auxiliaries and cavalry should be
provided, and Gaul and Italy reduced in his absence.
"caes.civ.1.30": [1.30] Therefore, for the present he relinquished all
intention of pursuing Pompey, and resolved to march to Spain, and commanded the
magistrates of the free towns to procure him ships, and to have them convoyed to
Brundusium. He detached Valerius, his lieutenant, with one legion to Sardinia;
Curio, the propraetor, to Sicily with three legions; and ordered him, when he
had recovered Sicily, to immediately transport his army to Africa. Marcus Cotta
was at this time governor of Sardinia: Marcus Cato, of Sicily: and Tubero, by
the lots, should have had the government of Africa. The Caralitani, as soon as
they heard that Valerius was sent against them, even before he left Italy, of
their own accord drove Cotta out of the town; who, terrified because he
understood that the whole province was combined [against him], fled from
Sardinia to Africa. Cato was in Sicily, repairing the old ships of war, and
demanding new ones from the states, and these things he performed with great
zeal. He was raising levies of Roman citizens, among the Lucani and Brutii, by
his lieutenants, and exacting a certain quota of horse and foot from the states
of Sicily. When these things were nearly completed, being informed of Curio's
approach, he made a complaint that he was abandoned and betrayed by Pompey, who
had undertaken an unnecessary war, without making any preparation, and when
questioned by him and other members in the senate, had assured them that every
thing was ready and provided for the war. After having made these complaints in
a public assembly, he fled from his province.
"caes.civ.1.31": [1.31] Valerius found Sardinia, and Curio, Sicily, deserted
by their governors when they arrived there with their armies. When Tubero
arrived in Africa, he found Attius Varus in the government of the province, who,
having lost his cohorts, as already related, at Auximum, had straightway fled to
Africa, and finding it without a governor, had seized it of his own accord, and
making levies, had raised two legions. From his acquaintance with the people and
country, and his knowledge of that province, he found the means of effecting
this; because a few years before, at the expiration of his praetorship, he had
obtained that province. He, when Tubero came to Utica with his fleet, prevented
his entering the port or town, and did not suffer his son, though laboring under
sickness, to set foot on shore; but obliged him to weigh anchor and quit the
place.
"caes.civ.1.32": [1.32] When these affairs were dispatched, Caesar, that
there might be an intermission from labor for the rest of the season, drew off
his soldiers to the nearest municipal towns, and set off in person for Rome.
Having assembled the senate, he reminded them of the injustice of his enemies;
and told them, "That he aimed at no extraordinary honor, but had waited for the
time appointed by law, for standing candidate for the consulate, being contented
with what was allowed to every citizen. That a bill had been carried by the ten
tribunes of the people (notwithstanding the resistance of his enemies, and a
very violent opposition from Cato, who in his usual manner, consumed the day by
a tedious harangue) that he should be allowed to stand candidate, though absent,
even in the consulship of Pompey; and if the latter disapproved of the bill, why
did he allow it to pass? if he approved of it, why should he debar him [Caesar]
from the people's favor? He made mention of his own patience, in that he had
freely proposed that all armies should be disbanded, by which he himself would
suffer the loss both of dignity and honor. He urged the virulence of his
enemies, who refused to comply with what they required from others, and had
rather that all things should be thrown into confusion, than that they should
lose their power and their armies. He expatiated on their injustice, in taking
away his legions: their cruelty and insolence in abridging the privileges of the
tribunes; the proposals he had made, and his entreaties of an interview which
had been refused him. For which reasons, he begged and desired that they would
undertake the management of the republic, and unite with him in the
administration of it. But if through fear they declined it, he would not be a
burden to them, but take the management of it on himself. That deputies ought to
be sent to Pompey, to propose a reconciliation; as he did not regard what Pompey
had lately asserted in the senate, that authority was acknowledged to be vested
in those persons to whom embassadors were sent, and fear implied in those that
sent them. That these were the sentiments of low, weak minds: that for his part,
as he had made it his study to surpass others in glory, so he was desirous of
excelling them in justice and equity."
"caes.civ.1.33": [1.33] The senate approved of sending deputies, but none
could be found fit to execute the commission: for every person, from his own
private fears, declined the office. For Pompey, on leaving the city, had
declared in the open senate, that he would hold in the same degree of
estimation, those who staid in Rome and those in Caesar's camp. Thus three days
were wasted in disputes and excuses. Besides, Lucius Metellus, one of the
tribunes, was suborned by Caesar's enemies, to prevent this, and to embarrass
every thing else which Caesar should propose. Caesar having discovered his
intention, after spending several days to no purpose, left the city, in order
that he might not lose any more time, and went to Transalpine Gaul, without
effecting what he had intended.
"caes.civ.1.34": [1.34] On his arrival there, he was informed that Vibullius
Rufus, whom he had taken a few days before at Corfinium, and set at liberty, was
sent by Pompey into Spain; and that Domitius also was gone to seize Massilia
with seven row-galleys, which were fitted up by some private persons at Igilium
and Cosa, and which he had manned with his own slaves, freedmen, and colonists:
and that some young noble men of Massilia had been sent before him; whom Pompey,
when leaving Rome had exhorted, that the late services of Caesar should not
erase from their minds the memory of his former favors. On receiving this
message, the Massilians had shut their gates against Caesar, and invited over to
them the Albici, who had formerly been in alliance with them, and who inhabited
the mountains that overhung Massilia: they had likewise conveyed the corn from
the surrounding country, and from all the forts into the city; had opened
armories in the city; and were repairing the walls, the fleet, and the gates.
"caes.civ.1.35": [1.35] Caesar sent for fifteen of the principal persons of
Massilia to attend him. To prevent the war commencing among them, he
remonstrates [in the following language]; "that they ought to follow the
precedent set by all Italy, rather than submit to the will of any one man." He
made use of such arguments as he thought would tend to bring them to reason. The
deputies reported his speech to their countrymen, and by the authority of the
state bring him back this answer: "That they understood that the Roman people
was divided into two factions: that they had neither judgment nor abilities to
decide which had the juster cause; but that the heads of these factions were
Cneius Pompey and Caius Caesar, the two patrons of the state: the former of whom
had granted to their state the lands of the Vocae Arecomici, and Helvii; the
latter had assigned them a part of his conquests in Gaul, and had augmented
their revenue. Wherefore, having received equal favors from both, they ought to
show equal affection to both, and assist neither against the other, nor admit
either into their city or harbors."
"caes.civ.1.36": [1.36] While this treaty was going forward, Domitius arrived
at Massilia with his fleet, and was received into the city, and made governor of
it. The chief management of the war was intrusted to him. At his command they
send the fleet to all parts; they seize all the merchantmen they could meet
with, and carry them into the harbor; they apply the nails, timber, and rigging,
with which they were furnished to rig and refit their other vessels. They lay up
in the public stores, all the corn that was found in the ships, and reserve the
rest of their lading and convoy for the siege of the town, should such an event
take place. Provoked at such ill treatment, Caesar led three legions against
Massilia, and resolved to provide turrets, and vineae to assault the town, and
to build twelve ships at Arelas, which being completed and rigged in thirty days
(from the time the timber was cut down), and being brought to Massilia, he put
under the command of Decimus Brutus; and left Caius Trebonius his lieutenant, to
invest the city.
"caes.civ.1.37": [1.37] While he was preparing and getting these things in
readiness, he sent Caius Fabius one of his lieutenants into Spain with three
legions, which he had disposed to winter quarters in Narbo, and the neighboring
country; and ordered him immediately to seize the passes of the Pyrenees, which
were at that time occupied by detachments from Lucius Afranius, one of Pompey's
lieutenants. He desired the other legions, which were passing the winter at a
great distance, to follow close after him. Fabius, according to his orders, by
using expedition, dislodged the party from the hills, and by hasty marches came
up with the army of Afranius.
"caes.civ.1.38": [1.38] On the arrival of Vibullius Rufus, whom, we have
already mentioned, Pompey had sent into Spain, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro,
his lieutenants (one of whom had the command of Hither Spain, with three
legions; the second of the country from the forest of Castulo to the river
Guadiana with two legions; the third from the river Guadiana to the country of
the Vettones and Lusitania, with the like number of legions) divided among
themselves their respective departments. Petreius was to march from Lusitania
through the Vettones, and join Afranius with all his forces; Varro was to guard
all Further Spain with what legions he had. These matters being settled,
reinforcements of horse and foot were demanded from Lusitania, by Petreius; from
the Celtiberi, Cantabri, and all the barbarous nations which border on the
ocean, by Afranius. When they were raised, Petreius immediately marched through
the Vettones to Afranius. They resolved by joint consent to carry on the war in
the vicinity of Herba, on account of the advantages of its situation.
"caes.civ.1.39": [1.39] Afranius, as above mentioned, had three legions,
Petreius two. There were besides about eighty cohorts raised in Hither and
Further Spain (of which, the troops belonging to the former province had
shields, those of the latter targets), and about five thousand horse raised in
both provinces. Caesar had sent his legions into Spain, with about six thousand
auxiliary foot, and three thousand horse, which had served under him in all his
former wars, and the same number from Gaul, which he himself had provided,
having expressly called out all the most noble and valiant men of each state.
The bravest of these were from the Aquitani and the mountaineers, who border on
the Province in Gaul. He had been informed that Pompey was marching through
Mauritania with his legions to Spain, and would shortly arrive. He at the same
time borrowed money from the tribunes and centurions, which he distributed among
his soldiers. By this proceeding he gained two points; he secured the interest
of the centurions by this pledge in his hands, and by his liberality he
purchased the affections of his army.
"caes.civ.1.40": [1.40] Fabius sounded the inclinations of the neighboring
states by letters and messengers. He had made two bridges over the river Segre,
at the distance of four miles from each other. He sent foraging parties over
these bridges, because he had already consumed all the forage that was on his
side of the river. The generals of Pompey's army did almost the same thing, and
for the same reason: and the horse had frequent skirmishes with each other. When
two of Fabius's legions had, as was their constant practice, gone forth as the
usual protection to the foragers, and had crossed the river, and the baggage,
and all the horse were following them, on a sudden, from the weight of the
cattle, and the mass of water, the bridge fell, and all the horse were cut off
from the main army, which being known to Petreius and Afranius, from the timber
and hurdles that were carried down the river, Afranius immediately crossed his
own bridge, which communicated between his camp and the town, with four legions
and all the cavalry, and marched against Fabius's two legions. When his approach
was announced, Lucius Plancus, who had the command of those legions, compelled
by the emergency, took post on a rising ground; and drew up his army with two
fronts, that it might not be surrounded by the cavalry. Thus, though engaged
with superior numbers, he sustained the furious charge of the legions and the
horse. When the battle was begun by the horse, there were observed at a distance
by both sides the colors of two legions, which Caius Fabius had sent round by
the further bridge to reinforce our men, suspecting, as the event verified, that
the enemy's generals would take advantage of the opportunity which fortune had
put in their way, to attack our men. Their approach put an end to the battle,
and each general led back his legions to their respective camps.
"caes.civ.1.41": [1.41] In two days after Caesar came to the camp with nine
hundred horse, which he had retained for a body guard. The bridge which had been
broken down by the storm was almost repaired, and he ordered it to be finished
in the night. Being acquainted with the nature of the country, he left behind
him six cohorts to guard the bridge, the camp, and all his baggage, and the next
day set off in person for Ilerda, with all his forces drawn up in three lines,
and halted just before the camp of Afranius, and having remained there a short
time under arms, he offered him battle on equal terms. When this affair was
made, Afranius drew out his forces, and posted them on the middle of a hill,
near his camp. When Caesar perceived that Afranius declined coming to an
engagement, he resolved to encamp at somewhat less than half a mile's distance
from the very foot of the mountain; and that his soldiers while engaged in their
works, might not be terrified by any sudden attack of the enemy, or disturbed in
their work, he ordered them not to fortify it with a wall, which must rise high,
and be seen at a distance, but draw, on the front opposite the enemy, a trench
fifteen feet broad. The first and second lines confined under arms, as was from
the first appointed. Behind them the third line was carrying on the work without
being seen; so that the whole was completed before Afranius discovered that the
camp was being fortified.
"caes.civ.1.42": [1.42] In the evening Caesar drew his legions within this
trench, and rested them under arms the next night. The day following he kept his
whole army within it, and as it was necessary to bring materials from a
considerable distance, he for the present pursued the same plan in his work; and
to each legion, one after the other, he assigned one side of the camp to
fortify, and ordered trenches of the same magnitude to be cut: he kept the rest
of the legions under arms without baggage to oppose the enemy. Afranius and
Petreius, to frighten us and obstruct the work, drew out their forces at the
very foot of the mountain, and challenged us to battle. Caesar, however, did not
interrupt his work, relying on the protection of the three legions, and the
strength of the fosse. After staying for a short time, and advancing no great
distance from the bottom of the hill, they led back their forces to their camp.
The third day Caesar fortified his camp with a rampart, and ordered the other
cohorts which he had left in the upper camp, and his baggage to be removed to
it.
"caes.civ.1.43": [1.43] Between the town of Ilerda and the next hill, on
which Afranius and Petreius were encamped, there was a plain about three hundred
paces broad, and near the middle of it an eminence somewhat raised above the
level: Caesar hoped that if he could get possession of this and fortify it, he
should be able to cut off the enemy from the town, the bridge, and all the
stores which they had laid up in the town. In expectation of this he led three
legions out of the camp, and, drawing up his army in an advantageous position,
he ordered the advanced men of one legion to hasten forward and seize the
eminence. Upon intelligence of this the cohorts which were on guard before
Afranius's camp were instantly sent a nearer way to occupy the same post. The
two parties engage, and as Afranius's men had reached the eminence first, our
men were repulsed, and, on a reinforcement being sent, they were obliged to turn
their backs and retreat to the standards of legions.
"caes.civ.1.44": [1.44] The manner of fighting of those soldiers was to run
forward with great impetuosity and boldly take a post, and not to keep their
ranks strictly, but to fight in small scattered parties: if hard pressed they
thought it no disgrace to retire and give up the post, being accustomed to this
manner of fighting among the Lusitanians and other barbarous nations; for it
commonly happens that soldiers are strongly influenced by the customs of those
countries in which they have spent much time. This method, however, alarmed our
men, who were not used to such a description of warfare. For they imagined that
they were about to be surrounded on their exposed flank by the single men who
ran forward from their ranks; and they thought it their duty to keep their
ranks, and not to quit their colors, nor, without good reason to give up the
post which they had taken. Accordingly, when the advanced guard gave way, the
legion which was stationed on that wing did not keep its ground, but retreated
to the next hill.
"caes.civ.1.45": [1.45] Almost the whole army being daunted at this, because
it had occurred contrary to their expectations and custom, Caesar encouraged his
men and led the ninth legion to their relief, and checked the insolent and eager
pursuit of the enemy, and obliged them, in their turn, to show their backs, and
retreat to Ilerda, and take post under the walls. But the soldiers of the ninth
legion, being over zealous to repair the dishonor which had been sustained,
having rashly pursued the fleeing enemy, advanced into disadvantageous ground
and went up to the foot of the mountain on which the town Ilerda was built. And
when they wished to retire they were again attacked by the enemy from the rising
ground. The place was craggy in the front and steep on either side, and was so
narrow that even three cohorts, drawn up in order of battle, would fill it; but
no relief could be sent on the flanks, and the horse could be of no service to
them when hard pressed. From the town, indeed, the precipice inclined with a
gentle slope for near four hundred paces. Our men had to retreat this way, as
they had, through their eagerness, advanced too inconsiderately. The greatest
contest was in this place, which was much to the disadvantage of our troops,
both on account of its narrowness, and because they were posted at the foot of
the mountain, so that no weapon was thrown at them without effect; yet they
exerted their valor and patience, and bore every wound. The enemy's forces were
increasing, and cohorts were frequently sent to their aid from the camp through
the town, that fresh men might relieve the weary. Caesar was obliged to do the
same, and relieve the fatigued by sending cohorts to that post.
"caes.civ.1.46": [1.46] After the battle had in this manner continued
incessantly for five hours, and our men had suffered much from superior numbers,
having spent all their javelins, they drew their swords and charged the enemy up
the hill, and, having killed a few, obliged the rest to fly. The cohorts being
beaten back to the wall, and some being driven by their fears into the town, an
easy retreat was afforded to our men. Our cavalry also, on either flank, though
stationed on sloping or low ground, yet bravely struggled up to the top of the
hill, and, riding between the two armies, made our retreat more easy and secure.
Such were the various turns of fortune in the battle. In the first encounter
about seventy of our men fell: among them Quintus Fulgenius, first centurion of
the second line of the fourteenth legion, who, for his extraordinary valor, had
been promoted from the lower ranks to that post. About six hundred were wounded.
Of Afranius's party there were killed Titus Caecilius, principal centurion, and
four other centurions, and above two hundred men.
"caes.civ.1.47": [1.47] But this opinion is spread abroad concerning this
day, that each party thought that they came off conquerors. Afranius's soldiers,
because, though they were esteemed inferior in the opinion of all, yet they had
stood our attack and sustained our charge, and, at first, had kept the post on
the hill which had been the occasion of the dispute; and, in the first
encounter, had obliged our men to fly: but ours, because, notwithstanding the
disadvantage of the ground and the disparity of numbers, they had maintained the
battle for five hours, had advanced up the hill sword in hand, and had forced
the enemy to fly from the higher ground and driven them into the town. The enemy
fortified the hill, about which the contest had been, with strong works and
posted a garrison on it.
"caes.civ.1.48": [1.48] In two days after this transaction, there happened an
unexpected misfortune. For so great a storm arose, that it was agreed that there
were never seen higher floods in those countries; it swept down the snow from
all the mountains, and broke over the banks of the river, and in one day carried
away both the bridges which Fabius had built- a circumstance which caused great
difficulties to Caesar's army. For as our camp, as already mentioned, was
pitched between two rivers, the Segre and Cinca, and as neither of these could
be forded for the space of thirty miles, they were all of necessity confined
within these narrow limits. Neither could the states, which had espoused
Caesar's cause, furnish him with corn, nor the troops, which had gone far to
forage, return, as they were stopped by the waters: nor could the convoys,
coming from Italy and Gaul, make their way to the camp. Besides, it was the most
distressing season of the year, when there was no corn in the blade, and it was
nearly ripe: and the states were exhausted, because Afranius had conveyed almost
all the corn, before Caesar's arrival, into Ilerda, and whatever he had left,
had been already consumed by Caesar. The cattle, which might have served as a
secondary resource against want, had been removed by the states to a great
distance on account of the war. They who had gone out to get forage or corn,
were chased by the light troops of the Lusitanians, and the targeteers of Hither
Spain, who were well acquainted with the country, and could readily swim across
the river, because it is the custom of all those people not to join their armies
without bladders.
"caes.civ.1.49": [1.49] But Afranius's army had abundance of everything; a
great stock of corn had been provided and laid in long before, a large quantity
was coming in from the whole province: they had a good store of forage. The
bridge of Ilerda afforded an opportunity of getting all these without any
danger, and the places beyond the bridge, to which Caesar had no access, were as
yet untouched.
"caes.civ.1.50": [1.50] Those floods continued several days. Caesar
endeavored to repair the bridges, but the height of the water did not allow him:
and the cohorts disposed along the banks did not suffer them to be completed;
and it was easy for them to prevent it, both from the nature of the river and
the height of the water, but especially because their darts were thrown from the
whole course of the bank on one confined spot; and it was no easy matter at one
and the same time to execute a work in a very rapid flood, and to avoid the
darts.
"caes.civ.1.51": [1.51] Intelligence was brought to Afranius that the great
convoys, which were on their march to Caesar, had halted at the river. Archers
from the Rutheni, and horse from the Gauls, with a long train of baggage,
according to the Gallic custom of traveling, had arrived there; there were
besides about six thousand people of all descriptions, with slaves and freed
men. But there was no order, or regular discipline, as every one followed his
own humor, and all traveled without apprehension, taking the same liberty as on
former marches. There were several young noblemen, sons of senators, and of
equestrian rank; there were embassadors from several states; there were
lieutenants of Caesar's. The river stopped them all. To attack them by surprise,
Afranius set out in the beginning of the night, with all his cavalry and three
legions, and sent the horse on before, to fall on them unawares; but the Gallic
horse soon got themselves in readiness, and attacked them. Though but few, they
withstood the vast number of the enemy, as long as they fought on equal terms;
but when the legions began to approach, having lost a few men, they retreated to
the next mountains. The delay occasioned by this battle was of great importance
to the security of our men; for having gained time, they retired to the higher
grounds. There were missing that day about two hundred bow-men, a few horse, and
an inconsiderable number of servants and baggage.
"caes.civ.1.52": [1.52] However, by all these things, the price of provisions
was raised, which is commonly a disaster attendant, not only on a time of
present scarcity, but on the apprehension of future want. Provisions had now
reached fifty denarii each bushel; and the want of corn had diminished the
strength of the soldiers; and the inconveniences were increasing every day; and
so great an alteration was wrought in a few days, and fortune had so changed
sides, that our men had to struggle with the want of every necessary; while the
enemy had an abundant supply of all things, and were considered to have the
advantage. Caesar demanded from those states which had acceded to his alliance,
a supply of cattle, as they had but little corn. He sent away the camp followers
to the more distant states, and endeavored to remedy the present scarcity by
every resource in his power.
"caes.civ.1.53": [1.53] Afranius and Petreius, and their friends, sent fuller
and more circumstantial accounts of these things to Rome, to their
acquaintances. Report exaggerated them so that the war appeared to be almost at
an end. When these letters and dispatches were received at Rome, a great
concourse of people resorted to the house of Afranius, and congratulations ran
high; several went out of Italy to Cneius Pompey; some of them, to be the first
to bring him the intelligence; others, that they might not be thought to have
waited the issue of the war, and to have come last of all.
"caes.civ.1.54": [1.54] When Caesar's affairs were in this unfavorable
position, and all the passes were guarded by the soldiers and horse of Afranius,
and the bridges could not be prepared, Caesar ordered his soldiers to make ships
of the kind that his knowledge of Britain a few years before had taught him.
First, the keels and ribs were made of light timber, then, the rest of the hulk
of the ships was wrought with wicker work, and covered over with hides. When
these were finished, he drew them down to the river in wagons in one night, a
distance of twenty-two miles from his camp, and transported in them some
soldiers across the river, and on a sudden took possession of a hill adjoining
the bank. This he immediately fortified, before he was perceived by the enemy.
To this he afterward transported a legion: and having begun a bridge on both
sides, he finished it in two days. By this means, he brought safe to his camp,
the convoys, and those who had gone out to forage; and began to prepare a
conveyance for the provisions.
"caes.civ.1.55": [1.55] The same day he made a great part of his horse pass
the river, who, falling on the foragers by surprise as they were dispersed
without any suspicions, intercepted an incredible number of cattle and people;
and when some Spanish light-armed cohorts were sent to reinforce the enemy, our
men judiciously divided themselves into two parts, the one to protect the spoil,
the other to resist the advancing foe, and to beat them back, and they cut off
from the rest and surrounded one cohort, which had rashly ventured out of the
line before the others, and after putting it to the sword, returned safe with
considerable booty to the camp over the same bridge.
"caes.civ.1.56": [1.56] While these affairs are going forward at Ilerda, the
Massilians, adopting the advice of Domitius, prepared seventeen ships of war, of
which eleven were decked. To these they add several smaller vessels, that our
fleet might be terrified by numbers; they man them with a great number of
archers and of the Albici, of whom mention has been already made, and these they
incited by rewards and promises. Domitius required certain ships for his own
use, which he manned with colonists and shepherds, whom he had brought along
with him. A fleet being thus furnished with every necessary, he advanced with
great confidence against our ships, commanded by Decimus Brutus. It was
stationed at an island opposite to Massilia.
"caes.civ.1.57": [1.57] Brutus was much inferior in number of ships; but
Caesar had appointed to that fleet the bravest men selected from all his
legions, antesignani and centurions, who had requested to be employed in that
service. They had provided iron hooks and harpoons, and had furnished themselves
with a vast number of javelins, darts, and missiles. Thus prepared, and being
apprised of the enemy's approach, they put out from the harbor, and engaged the
Massilians. Both sides fought with great courage and resolution; nor did the
Albici, a hardy people, bred on the highlands and inured to arms, fall much
short of our men in valor: and being lately come from the Massilians, they
retained in their minds their recent promises: and the wild shepherds,
encouraged by the hope of liberty, were eager to prove their zeal in the
presence of their masters.
"caes.civ.1.58": [1.58] The Massilians themselves, confiding in the quickness
of their ships, and the skill of their pilots, eluded ours, and evaded the
shock, and as long as they were permitted by clear space, lengthening their line
they endeavored to surround us, or to attack single ships with several of
theirs, or to run across our ships, and carry away our oars, if possible; but
when necessity obliged them to come nearer, they had recourse, from the skill
and art of the pilots, to the valor of the mountaineers. But our men, not having
such expert seamen, or skillful pilots, for they had been hastily drafted from
the merchant ships, and were not yet acquainted even with the names of the
rigging, were moreover impeded by the heaviness and slowness of our vessels,
which having been built in a hurry and of green timber, were not so easily
maneuvered. Therefore, when Caesar's men had an opportunity of a close
engagement, they cheerfully opposed two of the enemy's ships with one of theirs.
And throwing in the grappling-irons, and holding both ships fast, they fought on
both sides of the deck, and boarded the enemy's; and having killed numbers of
the Albici and shepherds, they sank some of their ships, took others with the
men on board, and drove the rest into the harbor. That day the Massilians lost
nine ships, including those that were taken.
"caes.civ.1.59": [1.59] When news of this battle was brought to Caesar at
Ilerda, the bridge being completed at the same time, fortune soon took a turn.
The enemy, daunted by the courage of our horse, did not scour the country as
freely or as boldly as before: but sometimes advancing a small distance from the
camp, that they might have a ready retreat, they foraged within narrower bounds:
at other times, they took a longer circuit to avoid our outposts and parties of
horse; or having sustained some loss, or descried our horse at a distance, they
fled in the midst of their expedition, leaving their baggage behind them; at
length they resolved to leave off foraging for several days, and, contrary to
the practice of all nations, to go out at night.
"caes.civ.1.60": [1.60] In the mean time the Oscenses and the Calagurritani,
who were under the government of the Oscenses, send embassadors to Caesar, and
offer to submit to his orders. They are followed by the Tarraconenses, Jacetani,
and Ausetani, and in a few days more by the Illurgavonenses, who dwell near the
river Ebro. He requires of them all, to assist him with corn, to which they
agreed, and having collected all the cattle in the country, they convey them
into his camp. One entire cohort of the Illurgavonenses, knowing the design of
their state, came over to Caesar, from the place where they were stationed, and
carried their colors with them. A great change is shortly made in the face of
affairs. The bridge being finished, five powerful states being joined to Caesar,
a way opened for the receiving of corn, and the rumors of the assistance of
legions which were said to be on their march, with Pompey at their head, through
Mauritania, having died away, several of the more distant states revolt from
Afranius, and enter into league with Caesar.
"caes.civ.1.61": [1.61] While the spirits of the enemy were dismayed at these
things, Caesar, that he might not be always obliged to send his horse a long
circuit round by the bridge, having found a convenient place, began to sink
several drains, thirty feet deep, by which he might draw off a part of the river
Segre, and make a ford over it. When these were almost finished, Afranius and
Petreius began to be greatly alarmed, lest they should be altogether cut off
from corn and forage, because Caesar was very strong in cavalry. They therefore
resolved to quit their posts, and to transfer the war to Celtiberia. There was,
moreover, a circumstance that confirmed them in this resolution: for of the two
adverse parties, that, which had stood by Sertorius in the late war, being
conquered by Pompey, still trembled at his name and sway, though absent: the
other which had remained firm in Pompey's interest, loved him for the favors
which they had received: but Caesar's name was not known to the barbarians. From
these they expected considerable aid, both of horse and foot, and hoped to
protract the war till winter, in a friendly country. Having come to this
resolution, they gave orders to collect all the ships in the river Ebro, and to
bring them to Octogesa, a town situated on the river Ebro, about twenty miles
distant from their camp. At this part of the river, they ordered a bridge to be
made of boats fastened together, and transported two legions over the river
Segre, and fortified their camp with a rampart, twelve feet high.
"caes.civ.1.62": [1.62] Notice of this being given by the scouts, Caesar
continued his work day and night, with very great fatigue to the soldiers, to
drain the river, and so far effected his purpose, that the horse were both able
and bold enough, though with some difficulty and danger, to pass the river; but
the foot had only their shoulders and upper part of their breast above the
water, so that their fording it was retarded, not only by the depth of the
water, but also by the rapidity of the current. However, almost at the same
instant, news was received of the bridge being nearly completed over the Ebro,
and a ford was found in the Segre.
"caes.civ.1.63": [1.63] Now indeed the enemy began to think that they ought
to hasten their march. Accordingly, leaving two auxiliary cohorts in the
garrison at Ilerda, they crossed the Segre with their whole force, and formed
one camp with the two legions which they had led across a few days before.
Caesar had no resource, but to annoy and cut down their rear; since with his
cavalry to go by the bridge, required him to take a long circuit; so that they
would arrive at the Ebro by a much shorter route. The horse, which he had
detached, crossed the ford, and when Afranius and Petreius had broken up their
camp about the third watch, they suddenly appeared on their rear, and spreading
round them in great numbers, retard and impede their march.
"caes.civ.1.64": [1.64] At break of day, it was perceived from the rising
grounds which joined Caesar's camp, that their rear was vigorously pressed by
our horse; that the last line sometimes halted and was broken; at other times,
that they joined battle and that our men were beaten back by a general charge of
their cohorts, and, in their turn, pursued them when they wheeled about: but
through the whole camp the soldiers gathered in parties, and declared their
chagrin that the enemy had been suffered to escape from their hands and that the
war had been unnecessarily protracted. They applied to their tribunes and
centurions, and entreated them to inform Caesar that he need not spare their
labor or consider their danger; that they were ready and able, and would venture
to ford the river where the horse had crossed. Caesar, encouraged by their zeal
and importunity, though he felt reluctant to expose his army to a river so
exceedingly large, yet judged it prudent to attempt it and make a trial.
Accordingly, he ordered all the weaker soldiers, whose spirit or strength seemed
unequal to the fatigue, to be selected from each century, and left them, with
one legion besides, to guard the camp: the rest of the legions he drew out
without any baggage, and, having disposed a great number of horses in the river,
above and below the ford, he led his army over. A few of his soldiers being
carried away by the force of the current, were stopped by the horse and taken
up, and not a man perished. His army being safe on the opposite bank, he drew
out his forces and resolved to lead them forward in three battalions: and so
great was the ardor of the soldiers that, notwithstanding the addition of a
circuit of six miles and a considerable delay in fording the river, before the
ninth hour of the day they came up with those who had set out at the third
watch.
"caes.civ.1.65": [1.65] When Afranius, who was in company with Petreius, saw
them at a distance, being affrighted at so unexpected a sight, he halted on a
rising ground and drew up his army. Caesar refreshed his army on the plain that
he might not expose them to battle while fatigued; and when the enemy attempted
to renew their march, he pursued and stopped them. They were obliged to pitch
their camp sooner than they had intended, for there were mountains at a small
distance; and difficult and narrow roads awaited them about five miles off. They
retired behind these mountains that they might avoid Caesar's cavalry, and,
placing parties in the narrow roads, stop the progress of his army and lead
their own forces across the Ebro without danger or apprehension. This it was
their interest to attempt and to effect by any means possible; but, fatigued by
the skirmishes all day, and by the labor of their march, they deferred it till
the following day; Caesar likewise encamped on the next hill.
"caes.civ.1.66": [1.66] About midnight a few of their men who had gone some
distance from the camp to fetch water, being taken by our horse, Caesar is
informed by them that the generals of the enemy were drawing their troops out of
the camp without noise. Upon this information Caesar ordered the signal to be
given and the military shout to be raised for packing up the baggage. When they
heard the shout, being afraid lest they should be stopped in the night and
obliged to engage under their baggage, or lest they should be confined in the
narrow roads by Caesar's horse, they put a stop to their march and kept their
forces in their camp. The next day Petreius went out privately with a few horse
to reconnoitre the country. A similar movement was made from Caesar's camp.
Lucius Decidius Saxa, was detached with a small party to explore the nature of
the country. Each returned with the same account to his camp, that there was a
level road for the next five miles, that there then succeeded a rough and
mountainous country. Whichever should first obtain possession of the defiles
would have no trouble in preventing the other's progress.
"caes.civ.1.67": [1.67] There was a debate in the council between Afranius
and Petreius, and the time of marching was the subject. The majority were of
opinion that they should begin their march at night, "for they might reach the
defiles before they should be discovered." Others, because a shout had been
raised the night before in Caesar's camp, used this as an argument that they
could not leave the camp unnoticed: "that Caesar's cavalry were patrolling the
whole night, and that all the ways and roads were beset; that battles at night
ought to be avoided, because, in civil dissension, a soldier once daunted is
more apt to consult his fears than his oath; that the daylight raised a strong
sense of shame in the eyes of all, and that the presence of the tribunes and
centurions had the same effect: by these things the soldiers would be restrained
and awed to their duty. Wherefore they should, by all means, attempt to force
their way by day; for, though a trifling loss might be sustained, yet the post
which they desired might be secured with safety to the main body of the army."
This opinion prevailed in the council, and the next day, at the dawn, they
resolved to set forward.
"caes.civ.1.68": [1.68] Caesar, having taken a view of the country, the
moment the sky began to grow white, led his forces from the camp and marched at
the head of his army by a long circuit, keeping to no regular road; for the road
which led to the Ebro and Octogesa was occupied by the enemy's camp, which lay
in Caesar's way. His soldiers were obliged to cross extensive and difficult
valleys. Craggy cliffs, in several places, interrupted their march, insomuch
that their arms had to be handed to one another, and the soldiers were forced to
perform a great part of their march unarmed, and were lifted up the rocks by
each other. But not a man murmured at the fatigue, because they imagined that
there would be a period to all their toils, if they could cut off the enemy from
the Ebro and intercept their convoys.
"caes.civ.1.69": [1.69] At first, Afranius's soldiers ran in high spirits
from their camp to look at us, and in contumelious language upbraided us, "that
we were forced, for want of necessary subsistence, to run away, and return to
Ilerda." For our route was different from what we proposed, and we appeared to
be going a contrary way. But their generals applauded their own prudence in
keeping within their camp, and it was a strong confirmation of their opinion,
that they saw we marched without wagons or baggage, which made them confident
that we could not long endure want. But when they saw our army gradually wheel
to the right, and observed our van was already passing the line of their camp,
there was nobody so stupid, or averse to fatigue, as not to think it necessary
to march from the camp immediately, and oppose us. The cry to arms was raised,
and all the army, except a few which were left to guard the camp, set out and
marched the direct road to the Ebro.
"caes.civ.1.70": [1.70] The contest depended entirely on dispatch, which
should first get possession of the defile and the mountains. The difficulty of
the roads delayed Caesar's army, but his cavalry pursuing Afranius's forces,
retarded their march. However, the affair was necessarily reduced to this point,
with respect to Afranius's men, that if they first gained the mountains, which
they desired, they would themselves avoid all danger, but could not save the
baggage of their whole army, nor the cohorts which they had left behind in the
camps, to which, being intercepted by Caesar's army, by no means could
assistance be given. Caesar first accomplished the march, and having found a
plain behind large rocks, drew up his army there in order of battle and facing
the enemy. Afranius, perceiving that his rear was galled by our cavalry, and
seeing the enemy before him, having come to a hill, made a halt on it. Thence he
detached four cohorts of Spanish light infantry to the highest mountain which
was in view: to this he ordered them to hasten with all expedition, and to take
possession of it, with the intention of going to the same place with all his
forces, then altering his route, and crossing the hills to Octogesa. As the
Spaniards were making toward it in an oblique direction, Caesar's horse espied
them and attacked them, nor were they able to withstand the charge of the
cavalry even for a moment, but were all surrounded and cut to pieces in the
sight of the two armies.
"caes.civ.1.71": [1.71] There was now an opportunity for managing affairs
successfully, nor did it escape Caesar, that an army daunted at suffering such a
loss before their eyes, could not stand, especially as they were surrounded by
our horse, and the engagement would take place on even and open ground. To this
he was importuned on all sides. The lieutenants, centurions, and tribunes,
gathered round him, and begged "that he would not hesitate to begin the battle:
that the hearts of all the soldiers were very anxious for it: that Afranius's
men had by several circumstances betrayed signs of fear; in that they had not
assisted their party; in that they had not quitted the hill; in that they did
not sustain the charge of our cavalry, but crowding their standards into one
place, did not observe either rank or order. But if he had any apprehensions
from the disadvantage of the ground, that an opportunity would be given him of
coming to battle in some other place: for that Afranius must certainly come
down, and would not be able to remain there for want of water."
"caes.civ.1.72": [1.72] Caesar had conceived hopes of ending the affair
without an engagement, or without striking a blow, because he had cut off the
enemy's supplies. Why should he hazard the loss of any of his men, even in a
successful battle? Why should he expose soldiers to be wounded, who had deserved
so well of him? Why, in short, should he tempt fortune? especially when it was
as much a general's duty to conquer by tactics as by the sword. Besides, he was
moved with compassion for those citizens, who, he foresaw, must fall: and he had
rather gain his object without any loss or injury to them. This resolution of
Caesar was not generally approved of; but the soldiers openly declared to each
other that since such an opportunity of victory was let pass, they would not
come to an engagement, even when Caesar should wish it. He persevered however in
his resolution, and retired a little from that place to abate the enemy's fears.
Petreius and Afranius, having got this opportunity, retired to their camp.
Caesar, having disposed parties on the mountains, and cut off all access to the
Ebro, fortified his camp as close to the enemy as he could.
"caes.civ.1.73": [1.73] The day following, the generals of his opponents,
being alarmed that they had lost all prospect of supplies, and of access to the
Ebro, consulted as to what other course they should take. There were two roads,
one to Ilerda, if they chose to return, the other to Tarraco, if they should
march to it. While they were deliberating on these matters, intelligence was
brought them that their watering parties were attacked by our horse: upon which
information, they dispose several parties of horse and auxiliary foot along the
road, and intermix some legionary cohorts, and begin to throw up a rampart from
the camp to the water, that they might be able to procure water within their
lines, both without fear, and without a guard. Petreius and Afranius divided
this task between themselves, and went in person to some distance from their
camp for the purpose of seeing it accomplished.
"caes.civ.1.74": [1.74] The soldiers having obtained by their absence a free
opportunity of conversing with each other, came out in great numbers, and
inquired each for whatever acquaintance or fellow-citizen he had in our camp,
and invited him to him. First they returned them general thanks for sparing them
the day before, when they were greatly terrified, and acknowledged that they
were alive through their kindness; then they inquired about the honor of our
general, and whether they could with safety intrust themselves to him; and
declared their sorrow that they had not done so in the beginning, and that they
had taken up arms against their relations and kinsmen. Encouraged by these
conferences, they desired the general's parole for the lives of Petreius and
Afranius, that they might not appear guilty of a crime, in having betrayed their
generals. When they were assured of obtaining their demands, they promised that
they would immediately remove their standards, and sent centurions of the first
rank as deputies to treat with Caesar about a peace. In the mean time some of
them invite their acquaintances, and bring them to their camp, others are
brought away by their friends, so that the two camps seemed to be united into
one, and several of the tribunes and centurions came to Caesar, and paid their
respects to him. The same was done by some of the nobility of Spain, whom they
summoned to their assistance, and kept in their camp as hostages. They inquired
after their acquaintance and friends, by whom each might have the means of being
recommended to Caesar. Even Afranius's son, a young man, endeavored, by means of
Sulpitius the lieutenant, to make terms for his own and his father's life. Every
place was filled with mirth and congratulations; in the one army, because they
thought they had escaped so impending danger; in the other, because they thought
they had completed so important a matter without blows; and Caesar, in every
man's judgment, reaped the advantage of his former lenity, and his conduct was
applauded by all.
"caes.civ.1.75": [1.75] When these circumstances were announced to Afranius,
he left the work which he had begun, and returned to his camp, determined as it
appeared, whatever should be the event, to bear it with an even and steady mind.
Petreius did not neglect himself; he armed his domestics; with them and the
praetorian cohort of Spaniards, and a few foreign horse, his dependents, whom he
commonly kept near him to guard his person, he suddenly flew to the rampart,
interrupted the conferences of the soldiers, drove our men from the camp, and
put to death as many as he caught. The rest formed into a body, and being
alarmed by the unexpected danger, wrapped their left arms in their cloaks, and
drew their swords, and in this manner, depending on the nearness of their camp,
defended themselves against the Spaniards, and the horse, and made good their
retreat to the camp, where they were protected by the cohorts which were on
guard.
"caes.civ.1.76": [1.76] Petreius, after accomplishing this, went round every
maniple, calling the soldiers by their names, and entreating with tears that
they would not give up him and their absent general Pompey, as a sacrifice to
the vengeance of their enemies. Immediately they ran in crowds to the general's
pavilion, when he required them all to take an oath that they would not desert
nor betray the army nor the generals, nor form any design distinct from the
general interest. He himself swore first to the tenor of those words, and
obliged Afranius to take the same oath. The tribunes and centurions followed
their example; the soldiers were brought out by centuries, and took the same
oath. They gave orders, that whoever had any of Caesar's soldiers should produce
them; as soon as they were produced, they put them to death publicly in the
praetorium, but most of them concealed those that they had entertained, and let
them out at night over the rampart. Thus the terror raised by the generals, the
cruelty of the punishments, the new obligation of an oath, removed all hopes of
surrender for the present, changed the soldiers' minds, and reduced matters to
the former state of war.
"caes.civ.1.77": [1.77] Caesar ordered the enemy's soldiers, who had come
into his camp to hold a conference, to be searched for with the strictest
diligence, and sent back. But of the tribunes and centurions, several
voluntarily remained with him, and he afterward treated them with great respect.
The centurions he promoted to higher ranks, and conferred on the Roman knights
the honor of tribunes.
"caes.civ.1.78": [1.78] Afranius's men were distressed in foraging, and
procured water with difficulty. The legionary soldiers had a tolerable supply of
corn, because they had beef ordered to bring from Ilerda sufficient to last
twenty-two days; the Spanish and auxiliary forces had none, for they had but few
opportunities of procuring any, and their bodies were not accustomed to bear
burdens; and therefore a great number of them came over to Caesar every day.
Their affairs were under these difficulties; but of the two schemes proposed,
the most expedient seemed to be to return to Ilerda, because they had left some
corn there; and there they hoped to decide on a plan for their future conduct.
Tarraco lay at a greater distance; and in such a space they knew affairs might
admit of many changes. Their design having met with approbation, they set out
from their camp. Caesar having sent forward his cavalry, to annoy and retard
their rear, followed close after with his legions. Not a moment passed in which
their rear was not engaged with our horse.
"caes.civ.1.79": [1.79] Their manner of fighting was this: the light cohorts
closed their rear, and frequently made a stand on the level grounds. If they had
a mountain to ascend, the very nature of the place readily secured them from any
danger; for the advanced guards, from the rising grounds, protected the rest in
their ascent. When they approached a valley or declivity, and the advanced men
could not impart assistance to the tardy, our horse threw their darts at them
from the rising grounds with advantage; then their affairs were in a perilous
situation; the only plan left was, that whenever they came near such places,
they should give orders to the legions to halt, and by a violent effort repulse
our horse; and these being forced to give way, they should suddenly, with the
utmost speed, run all together down to the valley, and having passed it, should
face about again on the next hill. For so far were they from deriving any
assistance from their horse (of which they had a large number), that they were
obliged to receive them into the center of their army, and themselves protect
them, as they were daunted by former battles. And on their march no one could
quit the line without being taken by Caesar's horse.
"caes.civ.1.80": [1.80] While skirmishes were fought in this manner, they
advanced but slowly and gradually, and frequently halted to help their rear, as
then happened. For having advanced four miles, and being very much harassed by
our horse, they took post on a high mountain, and there in trenched themselves
on the front only, facing the enemy; and did not take their baggage off their
cattle. When they perceived that Caesar's camp was pitched, and the tents fixed
up, and his horse sent out to forage, they suddenly rushed out about twelve
o'clock the same day, and, having hopes that we should be delayed by the absence
of our horse, they began to march, which Caesar perceiving, followed them with
the legions that remained. He left a few cohorts to guard his baggage, and
ordered the foragers to be called home at the tenth hour, and the horse to
follow him. The horse shortly returned to their daily duty on march, and charged
the rear so vigorously, that they almost forced them to fly; and several
privates and some centurions were killed. The main body of Caesar's army was at
hand, and universal ruin threatened them.
"caes.civ.1.81": [1.81] Then indeed, not having opportunity either to choose
a convenient position for their camp, or to march forward, they were obliged to
halt, and to encamp at a distance from water, and on ground naturally
unfavorable. But for the reasons already given, Caesar did not attack them, nor
suffer a tent to be pitched that day, that his men might be the readier to
pursue them whether they attempted to run off by night or by day. Observing the
defect in their position, they spent the whole night in extending their work,
and turning their camp to ours. The next day, at dawn, they do the same, and
spend the whole day in that manner, but in proportion as they advanced their
works, and extended their camp, they were further distant from the water; and
one evil was remedied by another. The first night, no one went out for water.
The next day, they left a guard in the camp, and led out all their forces to
water: but not a person was sent to look for forage. Caesar was more desirous
that they should be humbled by these means, and forced to come to terms, than
decide the contest by battle. Yet he endeavored to surround them with a wall and
trench, that he might be able to check their most sudden sally, to which he
imagined that they must have recourse. Hereupon, urged by want of fodder, that
they might be the readier for a march, they killed all their baggage cattle.
"caes.civ.1.82": [1.82] In this work, and the deliberations on it, two days
were spent. By the third day a considerable part of Caesar's work was finished.
To interrupt his progress, they drew out their legions about the eighth hour, by
a certain signal, and placed them in order of battle before their camp. Caesar
calling his legions off from their work, and ordering the horse to hold
themselves in readiness, marshaled his army: for to appear to decline an
engagement contrary to the opinion of the soldiers and the general voice, would
have been attended with great disadvantage. But for the reasons already known,
he was dissuaded from wishing to engage, and the more especially, because the
short space between the camps, even if the enemy were put to flight, would not
contribute much to a decisive victory; for the two camps were not distant from
each other above two thousand feet. Two parts of this were occupied by the
armies, and one third left for the soldiers to charge and make their attack. If
a battle should be begun, the nearness of the camps would afford a ready retreat
to the conquered party in the flight. For this reason Caesar had resolved to
make resistance if they attacked him, but not to be the first to provoke the
battle.
"caes.civ.1.83": [1.83] Afranius's five legions were drawn up in two lines,
the auxiliary cohorts formed the third line, and acted as reserves. Caesar had
three lines, four cohorts out of each of the five legions formed the first line.
Three more from each legion followed them, as reserves: and three others were
behind these. The slingers and archers were stationed in the center of the line;
the cavalry closed the flanks. The hostile armies being arranged in this manner,
each seemed determined to adhere to his first intention: Caesar not to hazard a
battle, unless forced to it; Afranius to interrupt Caesar's works. However, the
matter was deferred, and both armies kept under arms till sunset; when they both
returned to their camp. The next day Caesar prepared to finish the works which
he had begun. The enemy attempted to pass the river Segre by a ford. Caesar,
having perceived this, sent some light armed Germans and a party of horse across
the river, and disposed several parties along the banks to guard them.
"caes.civ.1.84": [1.84] At length, beset on all sides, their cattle having
been four days without fodder, and having no water, wood, or corn, they beg a
conference; and that, if possible, in a place remote from the soldiers. When
this was refused by Caesar, but a public interview offered if they chose it,
Afranius's son was given as a hostage to Caesar. They met in the place appointed
by Caesar. In the hearing of both armies Afranius spoke thus: "That Caesar ought
not to be displeased either with him or his soldiers, for wishing to preserve
their attachment to their general, Cneius Pompey. That they had now sufficiently
discharged their duty to him, and had suffered punishment enough, in having
endured the want of every necessary: but now, pent up almost like wild beasts,
they were prevented from procuring water, and prevented from walking abroad; and
were not able to bear the bodily pain or the mental disgrace: but confessed
themselves vanquished: and begged and entreated, if there was any room left for
mercy, that they should not be necessitated to suffer the most severe
penalties." These sentiments were delivered in the most submissive and humble
language.
"caes.civ.1.85": [1.85] Caesar replied, "That either to complain or sue for
mercy became no man less than him: for that every other person had done their
duty: himself, in having declined to engage on favorable terms, in an
advantageous situation and time, that all things tending to a peace might be
totally unembarrassed: his army, in having preserved and protected the men whom
they had in their power, notwithstanding the injuries which they had received,
and the murder of their comrades; and even Afranius's soldiers, who of
themselves treated about concluding a peace, by which they thought that they
would secure the lives of all. Thus, that the parties on both sides inclined to
mercy: that the generals only were averse to peace: that they paid no regard to
the laws either of conference or truce; and had most inhumanly put to death
ignorant persons, who were deceived by a conference: that therefore, they had
met that fate which usually befalls men from excessive obstinacy and arrogance;
and were obliged to have recourse, and most earnestly desire that which they had
shortly before disdained. That for his part, he would not avail himself of their
present humiliation, or his present advantage, to require terms by which his
power might be increased, but only that those armies, which they had maintained
for so many years to oppose him, should be disbanded: for six legions had been
sent into Spain, and a seventh raised there, and many and powerful fleets
provided, and generals of great military experience sent to command them, for no
other purpose than to oppose him: that none of these measures were adopted to
keep the Spains in peace, or for the use of the province, which, from the length
of the peace, stood in need of no such aid; that all these things were long
since designed against him; that against him a new sort of government was
established, that the same person should be at the gates of Rome, to direct the
affairs of the city; and though absent, have the government of two most warlike
provinces for so many years: that against him the laws of the magistrates had
been altered; that the late praetors and consuls should not be sent to govern
the provinces as had been the constant custom, but persons approved of and
chosen by a faction. That against him the excuse of age was not admitted; but
persons of tried experience in former wars were called up to take the command of
the armies: that with respect to him only, the routine was not observed which
had been allowed to all generals, that, after a successful war, they should
return home and disband their armies, if not with some mark of honor, at least
without disgrace; that he had submitted to all these things patiently, and would
still submit to them; nor did he now desire to take their army from them and
keep it to himself (which, however, would not be a difficult matter), but only
that they should not have it to employ against him: and therefore, as he said
before, let them quit the provinces, and disband their army. If this was
complied with, he would injure no person; that these were the last and only
conditions of peace."
"caes.civ.1.86": [1.86] It was very acceptable and agreeable to Afranius's
soldiers, as might be easily known from their signs of joy, that they who
expected some injury after this defeat, should obtain without solicitation the
reward of a dismissal. For when a debate was introduced about the place and time
of their dismissal, they all began to express, both by words and signs, from the
rampart where they stood, that they should be discharged immediately; for
although every security might be given, that they would be disbanded, still the
matter would be uncertain, if it was deferred to a future day. After a short
debate on either side, it was brought to this issue: that those who had any
settlement or possession in Spain, should be immediately discharged: the rest at
the river Var. Caesar gave security that they should receive no damage, and that
no person should be obliged against his inclination to take the military oath
under him.
"caes.civ.1.87": [1.87] Caesar promised to supply them with corn from the
present time till they arrived at the river Var. He further adds, that whatever
any of them lost in the war, which was in the possession of his soldiers, should
be restored to those that lost them. To his soldiers he made a recompense in
money for those things, a just valuation being made. Whatever disputes
Afranius's soldiers had afterward among themselves, they voluntarily submitted
to Caesar's decision. Afranius and Petreius, when pay was demanded by the
legions, a sedition almost breaking out, asserted that the time had not yet
come, and required that Caesar should take cognizance of it; and both parties
were content with his decision. About a third part of their army being dismissed
in two days, Caesar ordered two of his legions, to go before, the rest to follow
the vanquished enemy; that they should encamp at a small distance from each
other. The execution of this business he gave in charge to Quintus Fufius
Kalenus, one of his lieutenants. According to his directions, they marched from
Spain to the river Var, and there the rest of the army was disbanded.
End of Book 1