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"caes.gal.1.30": [1.30] When the war with the Helvetii was concluded,
embassadors from almost all parts of Gaul, the chiefs of states, assembled to
congratulate Caesar, [saying] that they were well aware, that, although he had
taken vengeance on the Helvetii in war, for the old wrong done by them to the
Roman people, yet that circumstance had happened no less to the benefit of the
land of Gaul than of the Roman people, because the Helvetii, while their affairs
were most flourishing, had quitted their country with the design of making war
upon the whole of Gaul, and seizing the government of it, and selecting, out of
a great abundance, that spot for an abode, which they should judge to be the
most convenient and most productive of all Gaul, and hold the rest of the states
as tributaries. They requested that they might be allowed to proclaim an
assembly of the whole of Gaul for a particular day, and to do that with Caesar's
permission, [stating] that they had some things which, with the general consent,
they wished to ask of him. This request having been granted, they appointed a
day for the assembly, and ordained by an oath with each other, that no one
should disclose [their deliberations] except those to whom this [office] should
be assigned by the general assembly.
"caes.gal.1.31": [1.31] When that assembly was dismissed, the same chiefs of
states, who had before been to Caesar, returned, and asked that they might be
allowed to treat with him privately (in secret) concerning the safety of
themselves and of all. That request having been obtained, they all threw
themselves in tears at Caesar's feet, [saying] that they no less begged and
earnestly desired that what they might say should not be disclosed, than that
they might obtain those things which they wished for; inasmuch as they saw,
that, if a disclosure was made, they should be put to the greatest tortures. For
these Divitiacus the Aeduan spoke and told him: "That there were two parties in
the whole of Gaul: that the Aedui stood at the head of one of these, the Arverni
of the other. After these had been violently struggling with one another for the
superiority for many years, it came to pass that the Germans were called in for
hire by the Arverni and the Sequani. That about 15,000 of them [i.e. of the
Germans] had at first crossed the Rhine: but after that these wild and savage
men had become enamored of the lands and the refinement and the abundance of the
Gauls, more were brought over, that there were now as many as 120,000 of them in
Gaul: that with these the Aedui and their dependents had repeatedly struggled in
arms-that they had been routed, and had sustained a great calamity-had lost all
their nobility, all their senate, all their cavalry. And that broken by such
engagements and calamities, although they had formerly been very powerful in
Gaul, both from their own valor and from the Roman people's hospitality and
friendship, they were now compelled to give the chief nobles of their state, as
hostages to the Sequani, and to bind their state by an oath, that they would
neither demand hostages in return, nor supplicate aid from the Roman people, nor
refuse to be forever under their sway and empire. That he was the only one out
of all the state of the Aedui, who could not be prevailed upon to take the oath
or to give his children as hostages. On that account he had fled from his state
and had gone to the senate at Rome to beseech aid, as he alone was bound neither
by oath nor hostages. But a worse thing had befallen the victorious Sequani than
the vanquished Aedui, for Ariovistus the king of the Germans, had settled in
their territories, and had seized upon a third of their land, which was the best
in the whole of Gaul, and was now ordering them to depart from another third
part, because a few months previously 24,000 men of the Harudes had come to him,
for whom room and settlements must be provided. The consequence would be, that
in a few years they would all be driven from the territories of Gaul, and all
the Germans would cross the Rhine; for neither must the land of Gaul be compared
with the land of the Germans, nor must the habit of living of the latter be put
on a level with that of the former. Moreover, [as for] Ariovistus, no sooner did
he defeat the forces of the Gauls in a battle which took place at Magetobria,
than [he began] to lord it haughtily and cruelly, to demand as hostages the
children of all the principal nobles, and wreak on them every kind of cruelty,
if every thing was not done at his nod or pleasure; that he was a savage,
passionate, and reckless man, and that his commands could no longer be borne.
Unless there was some aid in Caesar and the Roman people, the Gauls must all do
the same thing that the Helvetii have done, [viz.] emigrate from their country,
and seek another dwelling place, other settlements remote from the Germans, and
try whatever fortune may fall to their lot. If these things were to be disclosed
to Ariovistus, [Divitiacus adds] that he doubts not that he would inflict the
most severe punishment on all the hostages who are in his possession, [and says]
that Caesar could, either by his own influence and by that of his army, or by
his late victory, or by name of the Roman people, intimidate him, so as to
prevent a greater number of Germans being brought over the Rhine, and could
protect all Gaul from the outrages of Ariovistus.
"caes.gal.1.32": [1.32] When this speech had been delivered by Divitiacus,
all who were present began with loud lamentation to entreat assistance of
Caesar. Caesar noticed that the Sequani were the only people of all who did none
of those things which the others did, but, with their heads bowed down, gazed on
the earth in sadness. Wondering what was the reason of this conduct, he inquired
of themselves. No reply did the Sequani make, but silently continued in the same
sadness. When he had repeatedly inquired of them and could not elicit any answer
at all, the same Divitiacus the Aeduan answered, that-"the lot of the Sequani
was more wretched and grievous than that of the rest, on this account, because
they alone durst not even in secret complain or supplicate aid; and shuddered at
the cruelty of Ariovistus [even when] absent, just as if he were present; for,
to the rest, despite of every thing there was an opportunity of flight given;
but all tortures must be endured by the Sequani, who had admitted Ariovistus
within their territories, and whose towns were all in his power."
"caes.gal.1.33": [1.33] Caesar, on being informed of these things, cheered
the minds of the Gauls with his words, and promised that this affair should be
an object of his concern, [saying] that he had great hopes that Ariovistus,
induced both by his kindness and his power, would put an end to his oppression.
After delivering this speech, he dismissed the assembly; and, besides those
statements, many circumstances induced him to think that this affair ought to be
considered and taken up by him; especially as he saw that the Aedui, styled [as
they had been] repeatedly by the senate "brethren" and "kinsmen," were held in
the thraldom and dominion of the Germans, and understood that their hostages
were with Ariovistus and the Sequani, which in so mighty an empire [as that] of
the Roman people he considered very disgraceful to himself and the republic.
That, moreover, the Germans should by degrees become accustomed to cross the
Rhine, and that a great body of them should come into Gaul, he saw [would be]
dangerous to the Roman people, and judged, that wild and savage men would not be
likely to restrain themselves, after they had possessed themselves of all Gaul,
from going forth into the province and thence marching into Italy (as the Cimbri
and Teutones had done before them), particularly as the Rhone [was the sole
barrier that] separated the Sequani from our province. Against which events he
thought he ought to provide as speedily as possible. Moreover, Ariovistus, for
his part, had assumed to himself such pride and arrogance, that he was felt to
be quite insufferable.
"caes.gal.1.34": [1.34] He therefore determined to send embassadors to
Ariovistus to demand of him to name some intermediate spot for a conference
between the two, [saying] that he wished to treat him on state-business and
matters of the highest importance to both of them. To this embassy Ariovistus
replied, that if he himself had had need of any thing from Caesar, he would have
gone to him; and that if Caesar wanted any thing from him he ought to come to
him. That, besides, neither dare he go without an army into those parts of Gaul
which Caesar had possession of, nor could he, without great expense and trouble,
draw his army together to one place; that to him, moreover, it appeared strange,
what business either Caesar or the Roman people at all had in his own Gaul,
which he had conquered in war.
"caes.gal.1.35": [1.35] When these answers were reported to Caesar, he sends
embassadors to him a second time with this message. "Since, after having been
treated with so much kindness by himself and the Roman people (as he had in his
consulship been styled 'king and friend' by the senate), he makes this
recompense to [Caesar] himself and the Roman people, [viz.] that when invited to
a conference he demurs, and does not think that it concerns him to advise and
inform himself about an object of mutual interest, these are the things which he
requires of him; first, that he do not any more bring over any body of men
across the Rhine into Gaul; in the next place, that he restore the hostages,
which he has from the Aedui, and grant the Sequani permission to restore to them
with his consent those hostages which they have, and that he neither provoke the
Aedui by outrage nor make war upon them or their allies; if he would accordingly
do this," [Caesar says] that "he himself and the Roman people will entertain a
perpetual feeling of favor and friendship toward him; but that if he [Caesar]
does not obtain [his desires] that he (forasmuch as in the consulship of Marcus
Messala and Marcus Piso the senate had decreed that, whoever should have the
administration of the province of Gaul should, as far as he could do so
consistently with the interests of the republic, protect the Aedui and the other
friends of the Roman people), will not overlook the wrongs of the Aedui."
"caes.gal.1.36": [1.36] To this Ariovistus replied, that "the right of war
was, that they who had conquered should govern those whom they had conquered, in
what manner they pleased; that in that way the Roman people were wont to govern
the nations which they had conquered, not according to the dictation of any
other, but according to their own discretion. If he for his part did not dictate
to the Roman people as to the manner in which they were to exercise their right,
he ought not to be obstructed by the Roman people in his right; that the Aedui,
inasmuch as they had tried the fortune of war and had engaged in arms and been
conquered, had become tributaries to him; that Caesar was doing a great
injustice, in that by his arrival he was making his revenues less valuable to
him; that he should not restore their hostages to the Aedui, but should not make
war wrongfully either upon them or their allies, if they abided by that which
had been agreed on, and paid their tribute annually: if they did not continue to
do that, the Roman people's name of 'brothers' would avail them naught. As to
Caesar's threatening him, that he would not overlook the wrongs of the Aedui,
[he said] that no one had ever entered into a contest with him [Ariovistus]
without utter ruin to himself. That Caesar might enter the lists when he chose;
he would feel what the invincible Germans, well-trained [as they were] beyond
all others to arms, who for fourteen years had not been beneath a roof, could
achieve by their valor."
"caes.gal.1.37": [1.37] At the same time that this message was delivered to
Caesar, embassadors came from the Aedui and the Treviri; from the Aedui to
complain that the Harudes, who had lately been brought over into Gaul, were
ravaging their territories; that they had not been able to purchase peace from
Ariovistus, even by giving hostages: and from the Treviri, [to state] that a
hundred cantons of the Suevi had encamped on the banks of the Rhine, and were
attempting to cross it; that the brothers, Nasuas and Cimberius, headed them.
Being greatly alarmed at these things, Caesar thought that he ought to use all
dispatch, lest, if this new band of Suevi should unite with the old troops of
Ariovistus, he [Ariovistus] might be less easily withstood. Having therefore, as
quickly as he could, provided a supply of corn, he hastened to Ariovistus by
forced marches.
"caes.gal.1.38": [1.38] When he had proceeded three days' journey, word was
brought to him that Ariovistus was hastening with all his forces to seize on
Vesontio, which is the largest town of the Sequani, and had advanced three days'
journey from its territories. Caesar thought that he ought to take the greatest
precautions lest this should happen, for there was in that town a most ample
supply of every thing which was serviceable for war; and so fortified was it by
the nature of the ground, as to afford a great facility for protracting the war,
inasmuch as the river Doubs almost surrounds the whole town, as though it were
traced round it with a pair of compasses. A mountain of great height shuts in
the remaining space, which is not more than 600 feet, where the river leaves a
gap, in such a manner that the roots of that mountain extend to the river's bank
on either side. A wall thrown around it makes a citadel of this [mountain], and
connects it with the town. Hither Caesar hastens by forced marches by night and
day, and, after having seized the town, stations a garrison there.
"caes.gal.1.39": [1.39] While he is tarrying a few days at Vesontio, on
account of corn and provisions; from the inquiries of our men and the reports of
the Gauls and traders (who asserted that the Germans were men of huge stature,
of incredible valor and practice in arms-that oftentimes they, on encountering
them, could not bear even their countenance, and the fierceness of their
eyes)-so great a panic on a sudden seized the whole army, as to discompose the
minds and spirits of all in no slight degree. This first arose from the tribunes
of the soldiers, the prefects and the rest, who, having followed Caesar from the
city [Rome] from motives of friendship, had no great experience in military
affairs. And alleging, some of them one reason, some another, which they said
made it necessary for them to depart, they requested that by his consent they
might be allowed to withdraw; some, influenced by shame, stayed behind in order
that they might avoid the suspicion of cowardice. These could neither compose
their countenance, nor even sometimes check their tears: but hidden in their
tents, either bewailed their fate, or deplored with their comrades the general
danger. Wills were sealed universally throughout the whole camp. By the
expressions and cowardice of these men, even those who possessed great
experience in the camp, both soldiers and centurions, and those [the decurions]
who were in command of the cavalry, were gradually disconcerted. Such of them as
wished to be considered less alarmed, said that they did not dread the enemy,
but feared the narrowness of the roads and the vastness of the forests which lay
between them and Ariovistus, or else that the supplies could not be brought up
readily enough. Some even declared to Caesar, that when he gave orders for the
camp to be moved and the troops to advance, the soldiers would not be obedient
to the command, nor advance in consequence of their fear.
"caes.gal.1.40": [1.40] When Caesar observed these things, having called a
council, and summoned to it the centurions of all the companies, he severely
reprimanded them, "particularly, for supposing that it belonged to them to
inquire or conjecture, either in what direction they were marching, or with what
object. That Ariovistus, during his [Caesar's] consulship, had most anxiously
sought after the friendship of the Roman people; why should any one judge that
he would so rashly depart from his duty? He for his part was persuaded, that,
when his demands were known and the fairness of the terms considered, he would
reject neither his nor the Roman people's favor. But even if, driven on by rage
and madness, he should make war upon them, what after all were they afraid
of?-or why should they despair either of their own valor or of his zeal? Of that
enemy a trial had been made within our fathers' recollection, when, on the
defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones by Caius Marius, the army was regarded as
having deserved no less praise than their commander himself. It had been made
lately, too, in Italy, during the rebellion of the slaves, whom, however, the
experience and training which they had received from us, assisted in some
respect. From which a judgment might be formed of the advantages which
resolution carries with it inasmuch as those whom for some time they had
groundlessly dreaded when unarmed, they had afterward vanquished, when well
armed and flushed with success. In short, that these were the same men whom the
Helvetii, in frequent encounters, not only in their own territories, but also in
theirs [the German], have generally vanquished, and yet can not have been a
match for our army. If the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gauls
disquieted any, these, if they made inquiries, might discover that, when the
Gauls had been tired out by the long duration of the war, Ariovistus, after he
had many months kept himself in his camp and in the marshes, and had given no
opportunity for an engagement, fell suddenly upon them, by this time despairing
of a battle and scattered in all directions, and was victorious more through
stratagem and cunning than valor. But though there had been room for such
stratagem against savage and unskilled men, not even [Ariovistus] himself
expected that thereby our armies could be entrapped. That those who ascribed
their fear to a pretense about the [deficiency of] supplies and the narrowness
of the roads, acted presumptuously, as they seemed either to distrust their
general's discharge of his duty, or to dictate to him. That these things were
his concern; that the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones were to furnish the
corn; and that it was already ripe in the fields; that as to the road they would
soon be able to judge for themselves. As to its being reported that the soldiers
would not be obedient to command, or advance, he was not at all disturbed at
that; for he knew, that in the case of all those whose army had not been
obedient to command, either upon some mismanagement of an affair, fortune had
deserted them, or, that upon some crime being discovered, covetousness had been
clearly proved [against them]. His integrity had been seen throughout his whole
life, his good fortune in the war with the Helvetii. That he would therefore
instantly set about what he had intended to put off till a more distant day, and
would break up his camp the next night, in the fourth watch, that he might
ascertain, as soon as possible, whether a sense of honor and duty, or whether
fear had more influence with them. But that, if no one else should follow, yet
he would go with only the tenth legion, of which he had no misgivings, and it
should be his praetorian cohort." This legion Caesar had both greatly favored,
and in it, on account of its valor, placed the greatest confidence.
"caes.gal.1.41": [1.41] Upon the delivery of this speech, the minds of all
were changed in a surprising manner, and the highest ardor and eagerness for
prosecuting the war were engendered; and the tenth legion was the first to
return thanks to him, through their military tribunes, for his having expressed
this most favorable opinion of them; and assured him that they were quite ready
to prosecute the war. Then, the other legions endeavored, through their military
tribunes and the centurions of the principal companies, to excuse themselves to
Caesar, [saying] that they had never either doubted or feared, or supposed that
the determination of the conduct of the war was theirs and not their general's.
Having accepted their excuse, and having had the road carefully reconnoitered by
Divitiacus, because in him of all others he had the greatest faith [he found]
that by a circuitous route of more than fifty miles he might lead his army
through open parts; he then set out in the fourth watch, as he had said [he
would]. On the seventh day, as he did not discontinue his march, he was informed
by scouts that the forces of Ariovistus were only four and twenty miles distant
from ours.
"caes.gal.1.42": [1.42] Upon being apprized of Caesar's arrival, Ariovistus
sends embassadors to him, [saying] that what he had before requested as to a
conference, might now, as far as his permission went, take place, since he
[Caesar] had approached nearer, and he considered that he might now do it
without danger. Caesar did not reject the proposal and began to think that he
was now returning to a rational state of mind as he spontaneously proffered that
which he had previously refused to him when requesting it; and was in great
hopes that, in consideration of his own and the Roman people's great favors
toward him, the issue would be that he would desist from his obstinacy upon his
demands being made known. The fifth day after that was appointed as the day of
conference. Meanwhile, as ambassadors were being often sent to and fro between
them, Ariovistus demanded that Caesar should not bring any foot-soldier with him
to the conference, [saying] that "he was afraid of being ensnared by him through
treachery; that both should come accompanied by cavalry; that he would not come
on any other condition." Caesar, as he neither wished that the conference
should, by an excuse thrown in the way, be set aside, nor durst trust his life
to the cavalry of the Gauls, decided that it would be most expedient to take
away from the Gallic cavalry all their horses, and thereon to mount the
legionary soldiers of the tenth legion, in which he placed the greatest
confidence, in order that he might have a body-guard as trustworthy as possible,
should there be any need for action. And when this was done, one of the soldiers
of the tenth legion said, not without a touch of humor, "that Caesar did more
for them than he had promised; he had promised to have the tenth legion in place
of his praetorian cohort; but he now converted them into horse."
"caes.gal.1.43": [1.43] There was a large plain, and in it a mound of earth
of considerable size. This spot was at nearly an equal distance from both camps.
Thither, as had been appointed, they came for the conference. Caesar stationed
the legion, which he had brought [with him] on horseback, 200 paces from this
mound. The cavalry of Ariovistus also took their stand at an equal distance.
Ariovistus then demanded that they should confer on horseback, and that, besides
themselves, they should bring with them ten men each to the conference. When
they were come to the place, Caesar, in the opening of his speech, detailed his
own and the senate's favors toward him [Ariovistus], in that he had been styled
king, in that [he had been styled] friend, by the senate-in that very
considerable presents had been sent him; which circumstance he informed him had
both fallen to the lot of few, and had usually been bestowed in consideration of
important personal services; that he, although he had neither an introduction,
nor a just ground for the request, had obtained these honors through the
kindness and munificence of himself [Caesar] and the senate. He informed him
too, how old and how just were the grounds of connection that existed between
themselves [the Romans] and the Aedui, what decrees of the senate had been
passed in their favor, and how frequent and how honorable; how from time
immemorial the Aedui had held the supremacy of the whole of Gaul; even [said
Caesar] before they had sought our friendship; that it was the custom of the
Roman people to desire not only that its allies and friends should lose none of
their property, but be advanced in influence, dignity, and honor: who then could
endure that what they had brought with them to the friendship of the Roman
people should be torn from them?" He then made the same demands which he had
commissioned the embassadors to make, that [Ariovistus] should not make war
either upon the Aedui or their allies, that he should restore the hostages; that
if he could not send back to their country any part of the Germans, he should at
all events suffer none of them any more to cross the Rhine.
"caes.gal.1.44": [1.44] Ariovistus briefly replied to the demands of Caesar;
but expatiated largely on his own virtues, "that he had crossed the Rhine not of
his own accord, but on being invited and sent for by the Gauls; that he had not
left home and kindred without great expectations and great rewards; that he had
settlements in Gaul, granted by the Gauls themselves; that the hostages had been
given by their good-will; that he took by right of war the tribute which
conquerors are accustomed to impose on the conquered; that he had not made war
upon the Gauls, but the Gauls upon him; that all the states of Gaul came to
attack him, and had encamped against him; that all their forces had been routed
and beaten by him in a single battle; that if they chose to make a second trial,
he was ready to encounter them again; but if they chose to enjoy peace, it was
unfair to refuse the tribute, which of their own free-will they had paid up to
that time. That the friendship of the Roman people ought to prove to him an
ornament and a safeguard, not a detriment; and that he sought it with that
expectation. But if through the Roman people the tribute was to be discontinued,
and those who surrendered to be seduced from him, he would renounce the
friendship of the Roman people no less heartily than he had sought it. As to his
leading over a host of Germans into Gaul, that he was doing this with a view of
securing himself, not of assaulting Gaul: that there was evidence of this, in
that he did not come without being invited, and in that he did not make war, but
merely warded it off. That he had come into Gaul before the Roman people. That
never before this time did a Roman army go beyond the frontiers of the province
of Gaul. What [said he] does [Caesar] desire?- why come into his [Ariovistus]
domains?-that this was his province of Gaul, just as that is ours. As it ought
not to be pardoned in him, if he were to make an attack upon our territories;
so, likewise, that we were unjust, to obstruct him in his prerogative. As for
Caesar's saying that the Aedui had been styled 'brethren' by the senate, he was
not so uncivilized nor so ignorant of affairs, as not to know that the Aedui in
the very last war with the Allobroges had neither rendered assistance to the
Romans, nor received any from the Roman people in the struggles which the Aedui
had been maintaining with him and with the Sequani. He must feel suspicious,
that Caesar, though feigning friendship as the reason for his keeping an army in
Gaul, was keeping it with the view of crushing him. And that unless he depart
and withdraw his army from these parts, he shall regard him not as a friend, but
as a foe; and that, even if he should put him to death, he should do what would
please many of the nobles and leading men of the Roman people; he had assurance
of that from themselves through their messengers, and could purchase the favor
and the friendship of them all by his [Caesar's] death. But if he would depart
and resign to him the free possession of Gaul, he would recompense him with a
great reward, and would bring to a close whatever wars he wished to be carried
on, without any trouble or risk to him."
"caes.gal.1.45": [1.45] Many things were stated by Caesar to the effect [to
show]; "why he could not waive the business, and that neither his nor the Roman
people's practice would suffer him to abandon most meritorious allies, nor did
he deem that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus rather than to the Roman people; that
the Arverni and the Ruteni had been subdued in war by Quintus Fabius Maximus,
and that the Roman people had pardoned them and had not reduced them into a
province or imposed a tribute upon them. And if the most ancient period was to
be regarded-then was the sovereignty of the Roman people in Gaul most just: if
the decree of the Senate was to be observed, then ought Gaul to be free, which
they [the Romans] had conquered in war, and had permitted to enjoy its own
laws."
"caes.gal.1.46": [1.46] While these things are being transacted in the
conference it was announced to Caesar that the cavalry of Ariovistus were
approaching nearer the mound, and were riding up to our men, and casting stones
and weapons at them. Caesar made an end of his speech and betook himself to his
men; and commanded them that they should by no means return a weapon upon the
enemy. For though he saw that an engagement with the cavalry would be without
any danger to his chosen legion, yet he did not think proper to engage, lest,
after the enemy were routed, it might be said that they had been insnared by him
under the sanction of a conference. When it was spread abroad among the common
soldiery with what haughtiness Ariovistus had behaved at the conference, and how
he had ordered the Romans to quit Gaul, and how his cavalry had made an attack
upon our men, and how this had broken off the conference, a much greater
alacrity and eagerness for battle was infused into our army.
"caes.gal.1.47": [1.47] Two days after, Ariovistus sends embassadors to
Caesar, to state "that he wished to treat with him about those things which had
been begun to be treated of between them, but had not been concluded;" [and to
beg] that "he would either again appoint a day for a conference; or, if he were
not willing to do that, that he would send one of his [officers] as an
embassador to him." There did not appear to Caesar any good reason for holding a
conference; and the more so as the day before the Germans could not be
restrained from casting weapons at our men. He thought he should not without
great danger send to him as embassador one of his [Roman] officers, and should
expose him to savage men. It seemed [therefore] most proper to send to him C.
Valerius Procillus, the son of C. Valerius Caburus, a young man of the highest
courage and accomplishments (whose father had been presented with the freedom of
the city by C. Valerius Flaccus), both on account of his fidelity and on account
of his knowledge of the Gallic language, which Ariovistus, by long practice, now
spoke fluently; and because in his case the Germans would have no motive for
committing violence; and [as his colleague] M. Mettius, who had shared the
hospitality of Ariovistus. He commissioned them to learn what Ariovistus had to
say, and to report to him. But when Ariovistus saw them before him in his camp,
he cried out in the presence of his army, "Why were they come to him? Was it for
the purpose of acting as spies?" He stopped them when attempting to speak, and
cast them into chains.
"caes.gal.1.48": [1.48] The same day he moved his camp forward and pitched
under a hill six miles from Caesar's camp. The day following he led his forces
past Caesar's camp, and encamped two miles beyond him; with this design that he
might cut off Caesar from the corn and provisions, which might be conveyed to
him from the Sequani and the Aedui. For five successive days from that day,
Caesar drew out his forces before the camp, and put them in battle order, that,
if Ariovistus should be willing to engage in battle, an opportunity might not be
wanting to him. Ariovistus all this time kept his army in camp: but engaged
daily in cavalry skirmishes. The method of battle in which the Germans had
practiced themselves was this. There were 6,000 horse, and as many very active
and courageous foot, one of whom each of the horse selected out of the whole
army for his own protection. By these [foot] they were constantly accompanied in
their engagements; to these the horse retired; these on any emergency rushed
forward; if any one, upon receiving a very severe wound, had fallen from his
horse, they stood around him: if it was necessary to advance further than usual,
or to retreat more rapidly, so great, from practice, was their swiftness, that,
supported by the manes of the horses, they could keep pace with their speed.
"caes.gal.1.49": [1.49] Perceiving that Ariovistus kept himself in camp,
Caesar, that he might not any longer be cut off from provisions, chose a
convenient position for a camp beyond that place in which the Germans had
encamped, at about 600 paces from them, and having drawn up his army in three
lines, marched to that place. He ordered the first and second lines to be under
arms; the third to fortify the camp. This place was distant from the enemy about
600 paces, as has been stated. Thither Ariovistus sent light troops, about
16,000 men in number, with all his cavalry; which forces were to intimidate our
men, and hinder them in their fortification. Caesar nevertheless, as he had
before arranged, ordered two lines to drive off the enemy: the third to execute
the work. The camp being fortified, he left there two legions and a portion of
the auxiliaries; and led back the other four legions into the larger camp.
"caes.gal.1.50": [1.50] The next day, according to his custom, Caesar led out
his forces from both camps, and having advanced a little from the larger one,
drew up his line of battle, and gave the enemy an opportunity of fighting. When
he found that they did not even then come out [from their intrenchments,] he led
back his army into camp about noon. Then at last Ariovistus sent part of his
forces to attack the lesser camp. The battle was vigorously maintained on both
sides till the evening. At sunset, after many wounds had been inflicted and
received, Ariovistus led back his forces into camp. When Caesar inquired of his
prisoners, wherefore Ariovistus did not come to an engagement, he discovered
this to be the reason-that among the Germans it was the custom for their matrons
to pronounce from lots and divination, whether it were expedient that the battle
should be engaged in or not; that they had said, "that it was not the will of
heaven that the Germans should conquer, if they engaged in battle before the new
moon."
"caes.gal.1.51": [1.51] The day following, Caesar left what seemed sufficient
as a guard for both camps; [and then] drew up all the auxiliaries in sight of
the enemy, before the lesser camp, because he was not very powerful in the
number of legionary soldiers, considering the number of the enemy; that
[thereby] he might make use of his auxiliaries for appearance. He himself,
having drawn up his army in three lines, advanced to the camp of the enemy. Then
at last of necessity the Germans drew their forces out of camp, and disposed
them canton by canton, at equal distances, the Harudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci,
Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suevi; and surrounded their whole army with their
chariots and wagons, that no hope might be left in flight. On these they placed
their women, who, with disheveled hair and in tears, entreated the soldiers, as
they went forward to battle, not to deliver them into slavery to the Romans.
"caes.gal.1.52": [1.52] Caesar appointed over each legion a lieutenant and a
questor, that every one might have them as witnesses of his valor. He himself
began the battle at the head of the right wing, because he had observed that
part of the enemy to be the least strong. Accordingly our men, upon the signal
being given, vigorously made an attack upon the enemy, and the enemy so suddenly
and rapidly rushed forward, that there was no time for casting the javelins at
them. Throwing aside [therefore] their javelins, they fought with swords hand to
hand. But the Germans, according to their custom, rapidly forming a phalanx,
sustained the attack of our swords. There were found very many of our soldiers
who leaped upon the phalanx, and with their hands tore away the shields, and
wounded the enemy from above. Although the army of the enemy was routed on the
left wing and put to flight, they [still] pressed heavily on our men from the
right wing, by the great number of their troops. On observing which, P. Crassus,
a young man, who commanded the cavalry-as he was more disengaged than those who
were employed in the fight-sent the third line as a relief to our men who were
in distress.
"caes.gal.1.53": [1.53] Thereupon the engagement was renewed, and all the
enemy turned their backs, nor did they cease to flee until they arrived at the
river Rhine, about fifty miles from that place. There some few, either relying
on their strength, endeavored to swim over, or, finding boats, procured their
safety. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who meeting with a small vessel tied to
the bank, escaped in it; our horse pursued and slew all the rest of them.
Ariovistus had two wives, one a Suevan by nation, whom he brought with him from
home; the other a Norican, the sister of king Vocion, whom he had married in
Gaul, she having been sent [thither for that purpose] by her brother. Both
perished in that flight. Of their two daughters, one was slain, the other
captured. C. Valerius Procillus, as he was being dragged by his guards in the
fight, bound with a triple chain, fell into the hands of Caesar himself, as he
was pursuing the enemy with his cavalry. This circumstance indeed afforded
Caesar no less pleasure than the victory itself; because he saw a man of the
first rank in the province of Gaul, his intimate acquaintance and friend,
rescued from the hand of the enemy, and restored to him, and that fortune had
not diminished aught of the joy and exultation [of that day] by his destruction.
He [Procillus] said that, in his own presence, the lots had been thrice
consulted respecting him, whether he should immediately be put to death by fire,
or be reserved for another time: that by the favor of the lots he was uninjured.
M. Mettius, also, was found and brought back to him [Caesar.]
"caes.gal.1.54": [1.54] This battle having been reported beyond the Rhine,
the Suevi, who had come to the banks of that river, began to return home, when
the Ubii, who dwelt nearest to the Rhine, pursuing them, while much alarmed,
slew a great number of them. Caesar having concluded two very important wars in
one campaign, conducted his army into winter quarters among the Sequani, a
little earlier than the season of the year required. He appointed Labienus over
the winter-quarters, and set out in person for Hither Gaul to hold the assizes.
End of Book 1