Book 3
56 B.C.
"caes.gal.3.1": [3.1] When Caesar was setting out for Italy, he sent Servius
Galba with the twelfth legion and part of the cavalry, against the Nantuates,
the Veragri, and Seduni, who extend from the territories of the Allobroges, and
the lake of Geneva, and the River Rhone to the top of the Alps. The reason for
sending him was, that he desired that the pass along the Alps, through which
[the Roman] merchants had been accustomed to travel with great danger, and under
great imposts, should be opened. He permitted him, if he thought it necessary,
to station the legion in these places, for the purpose of wintering. Galba
having fought some successful battles and stormed several of their forts, upon
embassadors being sent to him from all parts and hostages given and a peace
concluded, determined to station two cohorts among the Nantuates, and to winter
in person with the other cohorts of that legion in a village of the Veragri,
which is called Octodurus; and this village being situated in a valley, with a
small plain annexed to it, is bounded on all sides by very high mountains. As
this village was divided into two parts by a river, he granted one part of it to
the Gauls, and assigned the other, which had been left by them unoccupied, to
the cohorts to winter in. He fortified this [latter] part with a rampart and a
ditch.
"caes.gal.3.2": [3.2] When several days had elapsed in winter quarters, and
he had ordered corn to be brought in he was suddenly informed by his scouts that
all the people had gone off in the night from that part of the town which he had
given up to the Gauls, and that the mountains which hung over it were occupied
by a very large force of the Seduni and Veragri. It had happened for several
reasons that the Gauls suddenly formed the design of renewing the war and
cutting off that legion. First, because they despised a single legion, on
account of its small number, and that not quite full (two cohorts having been
detached, and several individuals being absent, who had been dispatched for the
purpose of seeking provision); then, likewise, because they thought that on
account of the disadvantageous character of the situation, even their first
attack could not be sustained [by us] when they would rush from the mountains
into the valley, and discharge their weapons upon us. To this was added, that
they were indignant that their children were torn from them under the title of
hostages, and they were persuaded that the Romans designed to seize upon the
summits of the Alps, and unite those parts to the neighboring province [of
Gaul], not only to secure the passes, but also a constant possession.
"caes.gal.3.3": [3.3] Having received these tidings, Galba, since the works
of the winter-quarters and the fortifications were not fully completed, nor was
sufficient preparation made with regard to corn and other provisions (since, as
a surrender had been made, and hostages received, he had thought he need
entertain no apprehension of war), speedily summoning a council, began to
anxiously inquire their opinions. In which council, since so much sudden danger
had happened contrary to the general expectation, and almost all the higher
places were seen already covered with a multitude of armed men, nor could
[either] troops come to their relief, or provisions be brought in, as the passes
were blocked up [by the enemy]; safety being now nearly despaired of, some
opinions of this sort were delivered: that, "leaving their baggage, and making a
sally, they should hasten away for safety by the same routes by which they had
come thither." To the greater part, however, it seemed best, reserving that
measure to the last, to await the issue of the matter, and to defend the camp.
"caes.gal.3.4": [3.4] A short time only having elapsed, so that time was
scarcely given for arranging and executing those things which they had
determined on, the enemy, upon the signal being given, rushed down [upon our
men] from all parts, and discharged stones and darts, upon our rampart. Our men
at first, while their strength was fresh, resisted bravely, nor did they cast
any weapon ineffectually from their higher station. As soon as any part of the
camp, being destitute of defenders, seemed to be hard pressed, thither they ran,
and brought assistance. But they were over-matched in this, that the enemy when
wearied by the long continuance of the battle, went out of the action, and
others with fresh strength came in their place; none of which things could be
done by our men, owing to the smallness of their number; and not only was
permission not given to the wearied [Roman] to retire from the fight, but not
even to the wounded [was liberty granted] to quit the post where he had been
stationed, and recover.
"caes.gal.3.5": [3.5] When they had now been fighting for more than six
hours, without cessation, and not only strength, but even weapons were failing
our men, and the enemy were pressing on more rigorously, and had begun to
demolish the rampart and to fill up the trench, while our men were becoming
exhausted, and the matter was now brought to the last extremity, P. Sextius
Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, whom we have related to have been
disabled by severe wounds in the engagement with the Nervii, and also C.
Volusenus, a tribune of the soldiers, a man of great skill and valor, hasten to
Galba, and assure him that the only hope of safety lay in making a sally, and
trying the last resource. Whereupon assembling the centurions, he quickly gives
orders to the soldiers to discontinue the fight a short time, and only collect
the weapons flung [at them], and recruit themselves after their fatigue, and
afterward, upon the signal being given, sally forth from the camp, and place in
their valor all their hope of safety.
"caes.gal.3.6": [3.6] They do what they were ordered; and, making a sudden
sally from all the gates [of the camp], leave the enemy the means neither of
knowing what was taking place, nor of collecting themselves. Fortune thus taking
a turn, [our men] surround on every side, and slay those who had entertained the
hope of gaining the camp and having killed more than the third part of an army
of more than 30,000 men (which number of the barbarians it appeared certain had
come up to our camp), put to flight the rest when panic-stricken, and do not
suffer them to halt even upon the higher grounds. All the forces of the enemy
being thus routed, and stripped of their arms, [our men] betake themselves to
their camp and fortifications. Which battle being finished, inasmuch as Galba
was unwilling to tempt fortune again, and remembered that he had come into
winter quarters with one design, and saw that he had met with a different state
of affairs; chiefly however urged by the want of corn and provision, having the
next day burned all the buildings of that village, he hastens to return into the
province; and as no enemy opposed or hindered his march, he brought the legion
safe into the [country of the] Nantuates, thence into [that of] the Allobroges,
and there wintered.
"caes.gal.3.7": [3.7] These things being achieved, while Caesar had every
reason to suppose that Gaul was reduced to a state of tranquillity, the Belgae
being overcome, the Germans expelled, the Seduni among the Alps defeated, and
when he had, therefore, in the beginning of winter, set out for Illyricum, as he
wished to visit those nations, and acquire a knowledge of their countries, a
sudden war sprang up in Gaul. The occasion of that war was this: P. Crassus, a
young man, had taken up his winter quarters with the seventh legion among the
Andes, who border upon the [Atlantic] ocean. He, as there was a scarcity of corn
in those parts, sent out some officers of cavalry, and several military tribunes
among the neighbouring states, for the purpose of procuring corn and provision;
in which number T. Terrasidius was sent among the Esubii; M. Trebius Gallus
among the Curiosolitae; Q. Velanius, T. Silius, amongst the Veneti.
"caes.gal.3.8": [3.8] The influence of this state is by far the most
considerable of any of the countries on the whole sea coast, because the Veneti
both have a very great number of ships, with which they have been accustomed to
sail to Britain, and [thus] excel the rest in their knowledge and experience of
nautical affairs; and as only a few ports lie scattered along that stormy and
open sea, of which they are in possession, they hold as tributaries almost all
those who are accustomed to traffic in that sea. With them arose the beginning
[of the revolt] by their detaining Silius and Velanius; for they thought that
they should recover by their means the hostages which they had given to Crassus.
The neighboring people led on by their influence (as the measures of the Gauls
are sudden and hasty), detain Trebius and Terrasidius for the same motive; and
quickly sending embassadors, by means of their leading men, they enter into a
mutual compact to do nothing except by general consent, and abide the same issue
of fortune; and they solicit the other states to choose rather to continue in
that liberty which they had received from their ancestors, than endure slavery
under the Romans. All the sea coast being quickly brought over to their
sentiments, they send a common embassy to P. Crassus [to say], "If he wished to
receive back his officers, let him send back to them their hostages."
"caes.gal.3.9": [3.9] Caesar, being informed of these things by Crassus,
since he was so far distant himself, orders ships of war to be built in the mean
time on the river Loire, which flows into the ocean; rowers to be raised from
the province; sailors and pilots to be provided. These matters being quickly
executed, he himself, as soon as the season of the year permits, hastens to the
army. The Veneti, and the other states also, being informed of Caesar's arrival,
when they reflected how great a crime they had committed, in that, the
embassadors (a character which had among all nations ever been sacred and
inviolable) had by them been detained and thrown into prison, resolve to prepare
for a war in proportion to the greatness of their danger, and especially to
provide those things which appertain to the service of a navy, with the greater
confidence, inasmuch as they greatly relied on the nature of their situation.
They knew that the passes by land were cut off by estuaries, that the approach
by sea was most difficult, by reason of our ignorance of the localities, [and]
the small number of the harbors, and they trusted that our army would not be
able to stay very long among them, on account of the insufficiency of corn; and
again, even if all these things should turn out contrary to their expectation,
yet they were very powerful in their navy. They well understood that the Romans
neither had any number of ships, nor were acquainted with the shallows, the
harbors, or the islands of those parts where they would have to carry on the
war; and the navigation was very different in a narrow sea from what it was in
the vast and open ocean. Having come to this resolution, they fortify their
towns, convey corn into them from the country parts, bring together as many
ships as possible to Venetia, where it appeared Caesar would at first carry on
the war. They unite to themselves as allies for that war, the Osismii, the
Lexovii, the Nannetes, the Ambiliati, the Morini, the Diablintes, and the
Menapii; and send for auxiliaries from Britain, which is situated over against
those regions.
"caes.gal.3.10": [3.10] There were these difficulties which we have mentioned
above, in carrying on the war, but many things, nevertheless, urged Caesar to
that war;-the open insult offered to the state in the detention of the Roman
knights, the rebellion raised after surrendering, the revolt after hostages were
given, the confederacy of so many states, but principally, lest if, [the conduct
of] this part was overlooked, the other nations should think that the same thing
was permitted them. Wherefore, since he reflected that almost all the Gauls were
fond of revolution, and easily and quickly excited to war; that all men
likewise, by nature, love liberty and hate the condition of slavery, he thought
he ought to divide and more widely distribute his army, before more states
should join the confederation.
"caes.gal.3.11": [3.11] He therefore sends T. Labienus, his lieutenant, with
the cavalry to the Treviri, who are nearest to the river Rhine. He charges him
to visit the Remi and the other Belgians, and to keep them in their allegiance
and repel the Germans (who were said to have been summoned by the Belgae to
their aid,) if they attempted to cross the river by force in their ships. He
orders P. Crassus to proceed into Aquitania with twelve legionary cohorts and a
great number of the cavalry, lest auxiliaries should be sent into Gaul by these
states, and such great nations be united. He sends Q. Titurius Sabinus his
lieutenant, with three legions, among the Unelli, the Curiosolitae, and the
Lexovii, to take care that their forces should be kept separate from the rest.
He appoints D. Brutus, a young man, over the fleet and those Gallic vessels
which he had ordered to be furnished by the Pictones and the Santoni, and the
other provinces which remained at peace; and commands him to proceed toward the
Veneti, as soon as he could. He himself hastens thither with the land forces.
"caes.gal.3.12": [3.12] The sites of their towns were generally such that,
being placed on extreme points [of land] and on promontories, they neither had
an approach by land when the tide had rushed in from the main ocean, which
always happens twice in the space of twelve hours; nor by ships, because, upon
the tide ebbing again, the ships were likely to be dashed upon the shoals. Thus,
by either circumstance, was the storming of their towns rendered difficult; and
if at any time perchance the Veneti overpowered by the greatness of our works,
(the sea having been excluded by a mound and large dams, and the latter being
made almost equal in height to the walls of the town) had begun to despair of
their fortunes; bringing up a large number of ships, of which they had a very
great quantity, they carried off all their property and betook themselves to the
nearest towns; there they again defended themselves by the same advantages of
situation. They did this the more easily during a great part of the summer,
because our ships were kept back by storms, and the difficulty of sailing was
very great in that vast and open sea, with its strong tides and its harbors far
apart and exceedingly few in number.
"caes.gal.3.13": [3.13] For their ships were built and equipped after this
manner. The keels were somewhat flatter than those of our ships, whereby they
could more easily encounter the shallows and the ebbing of the tide: the prows
were raised very high, and, in like manner the sterns were adapted to the force
of the waves and storms [which they were formed to sustain]. The ships were
built wholly of oak, and designed to endure any force and violence whatever; the
benches which were made of planks a foot in breadth, were fastened by iron
spikes of the thickness of a man's thumb; the anchors were secured fast by iron
chains instead of cables, and for sails they used skins and thin dressed
leather. These [were used] either through their want of canvas and their
ignorance of its application, or for this reason, which is more probable, that
they thought that such storms of the ocean, and such violent gales of wind could
not be resisted by sails, nor ships of such great burden be conveniently enough
managed by them. The encounter of our fleet with these ships' was of such a
nature that our fleet excelled in speed alone, and the plying of the oars; other
things, considering the nature of the place [and] the violence of the storms,
were more suitable and better adapted on their side; for neither could our ships
injure theirs with their beaks (so great was their strength), nor on account of
their height was a weapon easily cast up to them; and for the same reason they
were less readily locked in by rocks. To this was added, that whenever a storm
began to rage and they ran before the wind, they both could weather the storm
more easily and heave to securely in the shallows, and when left by the tide
feared nothing from rocks and shelves: the risk of all which things was much to
be dreaded by our ships.
"caes.gal.3.14": [3.14] Caesar, after taking many of their towns, perceiving
that so much labor was spent in vain and that the flight of the enemy could not
be prevented on the capture of their towns, and that injury could not be done
them, he determined to wait for his fleet. As soon as it came up and was first
seen by the enemy, about 220 of their ships, fully equipped and appointed with
every kind of [naval] implement, sailed forth from the harbor, and drew up
opposite to ours; nor did it appear clear to Brutus, who commanded the fleet, or
to the tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions, to whom the several ships
were assigned, what to do, or what system of tactics to adopt; for they knew
that damage could not be done by their beaks; and that, although turrets were
built [on their decks], yet the height of the stems of the barbarian ships
exceeded these; so that weapons could not be cast up from [our] lower position
with sufficient effect, and those cast by the Gauls fell the more forcibly upon
us. One thing provided by our men was of great service, [viz.] sharp hooks
inserted into and fastened upon poles, of a form not unlike the hooks used in
attacking town walls. When the ropes which fastened the sail-yards to the masts
were caught by them and pulled, and our vessel vigorously impelled with the
oars, they [the ropes] were severed; and when they were cut away, the yards
necessarily fell down; so that as all the hope of the Gallic vessels depended on
their sails and rigging, upon these being cut away, the entire management of the
ships was taken from them at the same time. The rest of the contest depended on
courage; in which our men decidedly had the advantage; and the more so, because
the whole action was carried on in the sight of Caesar and the entire army; so
that no act, a little more valiant than ordinary, could pass unobserved, for all
the hills and higher grounds, from which there was a near prospect of the sea
were occupied by our army.
"caes.gal.3.15": [3.15] The sail yards [of the enemy], as we have said, being
brought down, although two and [in some cases] three ships [of theirs]
surrounded each one [of ours], the soldiers strove with the greatest energy to
board the ships of the enemy; and, after the barbarians observed this taking
place, as a great many of their ships were beaten, and as no relief for that
evil could be discovered, they hastened to seek safety in flight. And, having
now turned their vessels to that quarter in which the wind blew, so great a calm
and lull suddenly arose, that they could not move out of their place, which
circumstance, truly, was exceedingly opportune for finishing the business; for
our men gave chase and took them one by one, so that very few out of all the
number, [and those] by the intervention of night, arrived at the land, after the
battle had lasted almost from the fourth hour till sun-set.
"caes.gal.3.16": [3.16] By this battle the war with the Veneti and the whole
of the sea coast was finished; for both all the youth, and all, too, of more
advanced age, in whom there was any discretion or rank, had assembled in that
battle; and they had collected in that one place whatever naval forces they had
anywhere; and when these were lost, the survivors had no place to retreat to,
nor means of defending their towns. They accordingly surrendered themselves and
all their possessions to Caesar, on whom Caesar thought that punishment should
be inflicted the more severely, in order that for the future the rights of
embassadors might be more carefully respected by barbarians; having, therefore,
put to death all their senate, he sold the rest for slaves.
"caes.gal.3.17": [3.17] While these things are going on among the Veneti, Q.
Titurius Sabinus with those troops which he had received from Caesar, arrives in
the territories of the Unelli. Over these people Viridovix ruled, and held the
chief command of all those states which had revolted; from which he had
collected a large and powerful army. And in those few days, the Aulerci and the
Sexovii, having slain their senate because they would not consent to be
promoters of the war, shut their gates [against us] and united themselves to
Viridovix; a great multitude besides of desperate men and robbers assembled out
of Gaul from all quarters, whom the hope of plundering and the love of fighting
had called away from husbandry and their daily labor. Sabinus kept himself
within his camp, which was in a position convenient for everything; while
Viridovix encamped over against him at a distance of two miles, and daily
bringing out his forces, gave him an opportunity of fighting; so that Sabinus
had now not only come into contempt with the enemy, but also was somewhat
taunted by the speeches of our soldiers; and furnished so great a suspicion of
his cowardice that the enemy presumed to approach even to the very rampart of
our camp. He adopted this conduct for the following reason: because he did not
think that a lieutenant ought to engage in battle with so great a force,
especially while he who held the chief command was absent, except on
advantageous ground or some favorable circumstance presented itself.
"caes.gal.3.18": [3.18] After having established this suspicion of his
cowardice, he selected a certain suitable and crafty Gaul, who was one of those
whom he had with him as auxiliaries. He induces him by great gifts and promises
to go over to the enemy; and informs [him] of what he wished to be done. Who,
when he arrives among them as a deserter, lays before them the fears of the
Romans; and informs them by what difficulties Caesar himself was harassed, and
that the matter was not far removed from this- that Sabinus would the next night
privately draw off his army out of the camp and set forth to Caesar for the
purpose of carrying [him] assistance, which, when they heard, they a11 cry out
together that an opportunity of successfully conducting their enterprise, ought
not to be thrown away: that they ought to go to the [Roman] camp. Many things
persuaded the Gauls to this measure; the delay of Sabinus during the previous
days; the positive assertion of the [pretended] deserter; want of provisions,
for a supply of which they had not taken the requisite precautions; the hope
springing from the Venetic war; and [also] because in most cases men willingly
believe what they wish. Influenced by these things they do not discharge
Viridovix and the other leaders from the council, before they gained permission
from them to take up arms and hasten to [our] camp; which being granted,
rejoicing as if victory were fully certain, they collected faggots and
brushwood, with which to fill up the Roman trenches, and hasten to the camp.
"caes.gal.3.19": [3.19] The situation of the camp was a rising ground, gently
sloping from the bottom for about a mile. Thither they proceeded with great
speed (in order that as little time as possible might be given to the Romans to
collect and arm themselves), and arrived quite out of breath. Sabinus having
encouraged his men, gives them the signal, which they earnestly desired. While
the enemy were encumbered by reason of the burdens which they were carrying, he
orders a sally to be made suddenly from two gates [of the camp]. It happened, by
the advantage of situation, by the unskilfulness and the fatigue of the enemy,
by the valor of our soldiers, and their experience in former battles, that they
could not stand one attack of our men, and immediately turned their backs; and
our men with full vigor followed them while disordered, and slew a great number
of them; the horse pursuing the rest, left but few, who escaped by flight. Thus
at the same time, Sabinus was informed of the naval battle and Caesar of victory
gained by Sabinus; and all the states immediately surrendered themselves to
Titurius: for as the temper of the Gauls is impetuous and ready to undertake
wars, so their mind is weak, and by no means resolute in enduring calamities.
"caes.gal.3.20": [3.20] About the same time, P. Crassus, when he had arrived
in Aquitania (which, as has been before said, both from its extent of territory
and the great number of its people, is to be reckoned a third part of Gaul,)
understanding that he was to wage war in these parts, where a few years before,
L. Valerius Praeconinus, the lieutenant had been killed, and his army routed,
and from which L. Manilius, the proconsul, had fled with the loss of his
baggage, he perceived that no ordinary care must be used by him. Wherefore,
having provided corn, procured auxiliaries and cavalry, [and] having summoned by
name many valiant men from Tolosa, Carcaso, and Narbo, which are the states of
the province of Gaul, that border on these regions [Aquitania], he led his army
into the territories of the Sotiates. On his arrival being known, the Sotiates
having brought together great forces and [much] cavalry, in which their strength
principally lay, and assailing our army on the march, engaged first in a cavalry
action, then when their cavalry was routed, and our men pursuing, they suddenly
display their infantry forces, which they had placed in ambuscade in a valley.
These attacked our men [while] disordered, and renewed the fight.
"caes.gal.3.21": [3.21] The battle was long and vigorously contested, since
the Sotiates, relying on their former victories, imagined that the safety of the
whole of Aquitania rested on their valor; [and] our men, on the other hand,
desired it might be seen what they could accomplish without their general and
without the other legions, under a very young commander; at length the enemy,
worn out with wounds, began to turn their backs, and a great number of them
being slain, Crassus began to besiege the [principal] town of the Sotiates on
his march. Upon their valiantly resisting, he raised vineae and turrets. They at
one time attempting a sally, at another forming mines, to our rampart and vineae
(at which the Aquitani are eminently skilled, because in many places among them
there are copper mines); when they perceived that nothing could be gained by
these operations through the perseverance of our men, they send embassadors to
Crassus, and entreat him to admit them to a surrender. Having obtained it, they,
being ordered to deliver up their arms, comply.
"caes.gal.3.22": [3.22] And while the attention of our men is engaged in that
matter, in another part Adcantuannus, who held the chief command, with 600
devoted followers whom they call soldurii (the conditions of whose association
are these,-that they enjoy all the conveniences of life with those to whose
friendship they have devoted themselves: if any thing calamitous happen to them,
either they endure the same destiny together with them, or commit suicide: nor
hitherto, in the, memory of men, has there been found any one who, upon his
being slain to whose friendship he had devoted himself, refused to die);
Adcantuannus, [Isay] endeavoring to make a sally with these, when our soldiers
had rushed together to arms, upon a shout being raised at that part of the,
fortification, and a fierce battle had been fought there, was driven back into
the town, yet he obtained from Crassus [the indulgence] that he should enjoy the
same terms of surrender [as the other inhabitants].
"caes.gal.3.23": [3.23] Crassus, having received their arms and hostages,
marched into the territories of the Vocates and the Tarusates. But then, the
barbarians being alarmed, because they had heard that a town fortified by the
nature of the place and by art, had been taken by us in a few days after our
arrival there, began to send embassadors into all quarters, to combine, to give
hostages one to another, to raise troops. Embassadors also are sent to those
states of Hither Spain which are nearest to Aquitania, and auxiliaries and
leaders are summoned from them; on whose arrival they proceed to carry on the
war with great confidence, and with a great host of men. They who had been with
Q. Sertorius the whole period [of his war in Spain] and were supposed to have
very great skill in military matters, are chosen leaders. These, adopting the
practice of the Roman people, begin to select [advantageous] places, to fortify
their camp, to cut off our men from provisions, which, when Crassus observes,
[and likewise] that his forces, on account of their small number could not
safely be separated; that the enemy both made excursions and beset the passes,
and [yet] left sufficient guard for their camp; that on that account, corn and
provision could not very conveniently be brought up to him, and that the number
of the enemy was daily increased, he thought that he ought not to delay in
giving battle. This matter being brought to a council, when he discovered that
all thought the same thing, he appointed the next day for the fight.
"caes.gal.3.24": [3.24] Having drawn out all his forces at the break of day,
and marshaled them in a double line, he posted the auxiliaries in the center,
and waited to see what measures the enemy would take. They, although on account
of their great number and their ancient renown in war, and the small number of
our men, they supposed they might safely fight, nevertheless considered it safer
to gain the victory without any wound, by besetting the passes [and] cutting off
the provisions: and if the Romans, on account of the want of corn, should begin
to retreat, they intended to attack them while encumbered in their march and
depressed in spirit [as being assailed while] under baggage. This measure being
approved of by the leaders and the forces of the Romans drawn out, the enemy
[still] kept themselves in their camp. Crassus having remarked this
circumstance, since the enemy, intimidated by their own delay, and by the
reputation [i.e. for cowardice arising thence] had rendered our soldiers more
eager for fighting, and the remarks of all were heard [declaring] that no longer
ought delay to be made in going to the camp, after encouraging his men, he
marches to the camp of the enemy, to the great gratification of his own troops.)
"caes.gal.3.25": [3.25] There, while some were filling up the ditch, and
others, by throwing a large number of darts, were driving the defenders from the
rampart and fortifications, and the auxiliaries, on whom Crassus did not much
rely in the battle, by supplying stones and weapons [to the soldiers], and by
conveying turf to the mound, presented the appearance and character of men
engaged in fighting; while also the enemy were fighting resolutely and boldly,
and their weapons, discharged from their higher position, fell with great
effect; the horse, having gone round the camp of the enemy, reported to Crassus
that the camp was not fortified with equal care on the side of the Decuman gate,
and had an easy approach.
"caes.gal.3.26": [3.26] Crassus, having exhorted the commanders of the horse
to animate their men by great rewards and promises, points out to them what he
wished to have done. They, as they had been commanded, having brought out the
four cohorts, which, as they had been left as a guard for the camp, were not
fatigued by exertion, and having led them round by a some what longer way, lest
they could be seen from the camp of the enemy, when the eyes and minds of all
were intent upon the battle, quickly arrived at those fortifications which we
have spoken of, and, having demolished these, stood in the camp of the enemy
before they were seen by them, or it was known what was going on. And then, a
shout being heard in that quarter, our men, their strength having been
recruited, (which usually occurs on the hope of victory), began to fight more
vigorously. The enemy surrounded on all sides, [and] all their affairs being
despaired of, made great attempts to cast themselves down over the ramparts and
to seek safety in flight. These the cavalry pursued over the very open plains,
and after leaving scarcely a fourth part out of the number of 50,000, which it
was certain had assembled out of Aquitania and from the Cantabri, returned late
at night to the camp.
"caes.gal.3.27": [3.27] Having heard of this battle, the greatest part of
Aquitania surrendered itself to Crassus, and of its own accord sent hostages, in
which number were the Tarbelli, the Bigerriones, the Preciani, the Vocasates,
the Tarusates, the Elurates, the Garites, the Ausci, the Garumni, the Sibuzates,
the Cocosates. A few [and those] most remote nations, relying on the time of the
year, because winter was at hand, neglected to do this.
"caes.gal.3.28": [3.28] About the same time Caesar, although the summer was
nearly past, yet, since, all Gaul being reduced, the Morini and the Menapii
alone remained in arms, and had never sent embassadors to him [to make a treaty]
of peace, speedily led his army thither, thinking that that war might soon be
terminated. They resolved to conduct the war on a very different method from the
rest of the Gauls; for as they perceived that the greatest nations [of Gaul] who
had engaged in war, had been routed and overcome, and as they possessed
continuous ranges of forests and morasses, they removed themselves and all their
property thither. When Caesar had arrived at the opening of these forests, and
had began to fortify his camp, and no enemy was in the mean time seen, while our
men were dispersed on their respective duties, they suddenly rushed out from all
parts of the forest, and made an attack on our men. The latter quickly took up
arms and drove them back again to their forests; and having killed a great many,
lost a few of their own men while pursuing them too far through those intricate
places.
"caes.gal.3.29": [3.29] During the remaining days after this, Caesar began to
cut down the forests; and that no attack might be made on the flank of the
soldiers, while unarmed and not foreseeing it, he placed together (opposite to
the enemy) all that timber which was cut down, and piled it up as a rampart on
either flank. When a great space had been, with incredible speed, cleared in a
few days, when the cattle [of the enemy] and the rear of their baggage train
were already seized by our men, and they themselves were seeking for the
thickest parts of the forests, storms of such a kind came on that the work was
necessarily suspended, and, through the continuance of the rains, the soldiers
could not any longer remain in their tents. Therefore, having laid waste all
their country, [and] having burned their villages and houses, Caesar led back
his army and stationed them in winter quarters among the Aulerci and Lexovii,
and the other states which had made war upon him last.
End of Book 3